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My thesis is an examination of the Cold War during the 1980s, with a focus on arms

dealing and diplomacy under President Ronald Reagan from 1981-1989. I chose to write about

three specific case studies based on the unique intersections ofAmerican diplomatic goals in
relation to geography, the sophistication of weapons technology involved, and geopolitical
considerations. The purpose of this thesis is to explain why and how the Reagan administration
was able to carry out three separate arms deals, and in turn, howthose deals fit into the broader,

global Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Myconclusions are based on

primary source research done at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley,
California. I argue that the Soviet Union-related policies of the Reagan administration, as first
outlined in National Security Decision Directive 75 in January 1983, acted as an accelerant to, not
the catalyst of, the rapid and precipitous decline of Soviet power and influence which occurred

while Reagan was in office. Understanding why and how the Cold War ended is important not
only to historians, but society in general because of the lessons to be learned about conflict and
cooperation between major powers.
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INTRODUCTION

In July 2010 the controversial website Wikileaks published thousands of classified
documents regarding the ongoing war in Afghanistan. Among the papers was a report claiming
that the Taliban had used heat-seeking missiles against allied aircraft. How could the Taliban
have procured such high-tech weapons in a time of war? Actually, Taliban fighters were using

missiles that were acquired during an earlier war. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
December 1979, the United States increasingly sent military support to Afghan resistance fighters
known as the Mujahedeen. One type of aid came in the form of an anti-aircraft missile known as
the Stinger. Distribution was sloppy during the resistance, and reclamation was even worse in the
aftermath of the final Soviet withdrawal in 1989. As a result, after the US military invaded
Afghanistan in late 2001, American weapons were used to attack American soldiers. This
admittedly brief summary is just one example of how we in the present live among the

consequences of our predecessors' actions. However, to paraphrase George Santayana, we need
not repeat the mistakes of the past if we understand their context.

When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 his ideology was no secret. He felt that the
Soviet Union was the greatest threat to the American way of life, and accordingly, the United

States must negotiate with the Soviets from a position of strength, both economically and
militarily. This policy was reflected in the Reagan Doctrine: the belief that it is in the United
States' national interest to support anti-communist activity around the world in order to
undermine Soviet geopolitical strategies, thereby improving the American position of strength.
Under this policy, outlined specifically in the January 1983 National Security Decision Directive
75, Reagan supported proxy wars around the world, escalated the arms race, and in the process,
hastened the end of the Soviet empire. Furthermore, by maintaining an open invitation for
diplomatic relations with governments in military conflict with US proxy forces, Reagan's
policies as defined in NSDD 75 necessarily connected foreign policy with arms dealing.

1

Reagan's policies also contributed to a weakened bipartisan foreign policy consensus, and
intensified market-research politics in America.
Because this thesis is multi-disciplinary, there is a daunting amount of literature that
touches on several relevant research topics. Additionally, since the collapse of the Soviet Union
there has been an important shift in the way Reagan and the Cold War have been written about in
general. The fall of communism caused historians to reevaluate previous held dogmas about
ideology, hegemony, and globalization. This new research is based on previously unheard of
access to former Soviet archives, beginning after 1991. This thesis focuses on major works from
noted historians produced within the last ten years.

The Reagan Presidential Library website lists a bibliography of one hundred thirty-three
associated books. A cursory search ofAmazon.com returns four hundred forty-seven books
written about Ronald Reagan since January 2000 alone. The topics range from serious biography

and political analysis to memorable quotes andjelly beans.1
Some of the most interesting starting points of research for this thesis have come from the
book Victory by Peter Schweizer, a conservative author and former administration lawyer.
Although Victory is not a history book, (there are virtually no footnotes) it does include several
intriguing stories from an insider's perspective. Chief among them is Schweizer's explanation of

how the Reagan administration hoped to move from a policy of containment to winning the Cold
War. Schweizer writes:

One of the most popular books on Ronald Reagan is Reagan: How an Ordinary Man Became an
Extraordinary Leader by Dinesh D'Souza. D'Souza argues that Reagan was the symbol of the modern
conservative movement without ever actively seeking that consideration. Notably missing is from
D'Souza's text is an in-depth discussion of the Iran-Contra Affair or the deficit spending policies of the
administration. Instead D'Souza focuses on Reagan's political and intellectual importance. Another
example of the extensive Reagan literature is Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up by
Lawrence Walsh. Walsh was the leader of the independent counsel legal team tasked with investigating
and prosecuting illegal activities associated with the Iran-Contra Affair. His book is an attempt to describe,
sometimes with excruciating detail, the story of his team's investigation and the deliberate cover-up and
obfuscation of evidence by the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. Published only ten
years after the original events, Firewall is far from representative of historical consensus on either IranContra or Bush. But it is a highly detailed inside look of how people in power define truth and loyalty, and
the lengths to which they will go to protect their interests.

The 'resource crisis' that the Soviet leadership faced the 1980s was not caused by
American policy; it was inherent in the system. But what is only now emerging
is the fact that the United States had a comprehensive policy to exacerbate this
crisis. That policy took many forms: hidden diplomacy, covert operations, a
technically intense and sustained defense buildup, as well as a series of actions

designed to throw sand in the gears of the Soviet economy.2
That meant a shift from containing Soviet strengths to putting pressure on Soviet weaknesses.
The administration felt that there were two interrelated courses of action which could accomplish
their goal. First, cut off western technology that was being sold to Soviets, thereby hampering
modernization in the USSR and exacerbating an already faltering economy, and second, provoke
the Soviets into an accelerated arms race based on technological innovation and deficit spending.
Schweizer's book is full of statements similar to the one above, but again we run into the problem

of sources. Because Victory is so poorly noted, I have taken it as an opportunity to track down
the proof behind the words and see if Schweizer has repeated rhetoric or fact.
The key body of literature for this thesis concerns the Cold War. Two recent works

emphasize thevarious approaches to studying the Cold Warin the new century.3 The first is by
historian Melvyn P. Leffler. His 2007 book, For the Soul ofMankind, is a hybrid of biography
and case studies. He asks several questions in this book, including: Why did the Cold War last so

2Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse ofthe
Soviet Union (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), xiii.

3Leffler andJohn Lewis Gaddis are two of the most prominent Cold Warhistorians to date. Their work is
especially important because they both published extensively on both sides of the 1989-91 time period. We
are now able to compare how these authors viewed the Cold War from two differently informed times.
Leffler's opus, A Preponderance ofPower, was published in 1992, but Soviet archives had yet to be
opened. He closes this book with the following lament: "We will need to wait patiently for the opening of
Soviet archival materials, and even then the information will be fragmentary and incomplete." See Melvin
Leffler, A Preponderance ofPower: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 517. Leffler's For the Soul ofMankind is a perfect
example of how even the best history is necessarily rewritten as new information comes to light. Gaddis
can be cast in a similar light. In his 1987 book The Long Peace, Gaddis wrote that history "has a habit of
making bad prophets out of both those who make and those who chronicle it." See John Lewis Gaddis, The
Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History ofthe Cold War(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 244.
In his 2005 book The Cold War: A New History, Gaddis wrote, "Humility is in order, therefore, when
trying to assess the Cold War's significance: the recent past is bound to look different when viewed through
the binoculars of a distant future." See John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: The
Penguin Press, 2005), 260. He writes that his new book was meant for a new generation of readers, and
that with the opening of archives "we know much more: so much, in fact, that it's easy to get
overwhelmed." Gaddis, A New History, preface X. Neither Leffler nor Gaddis needed to completely alter
their previous approaches; rather they were able to supplement previous research in order to arrive at more
complete conclusions regarding the history of the Cold War.

long? Why did both sides not back away from a mutually understood poor situation? And what
changed in the mid-1980s that allowed Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan to step back from
the brink? Leffler's ultimate conclusion is that above all other individuals Gorbachev was

responsible for the end of the Cold War. Reagan hated communism, but did not fear it, and he

believed that the US could win a protracted war of ideology.
Another example of recent Cold War studies is Odd Arne Westad's 2005 work, The

Global Cold War. Westad discusses the foundation of ideology and expansion in the US and
USSR in relation to Third World policy. The argument that Westad makes is that although both
superpowers had hoped to direct Third World policies in a bi-polar worldview, the reality was
that they could only influence what was already a force of its own. The people who lived in the
Third World nations themselves, of course, had their own agendas outside of those held by the
US and USSR. Cooperation with one or the other superpower (and sometimes both) could be a
means to their ends, but as the Cold War endured, Third World government policies were not

necessarily dictated by Washington or Moscow.
Leffler represents the old guard of Cold War historians who have been reenergized by the
sudden access to Eastern European and Soviet archives, coupled with an ever-expanding library

of memoirs and journals from former communist politicians and world leaders. Westad
represents a generation of historians that treat the Cold War as a global, rather than bipolar, field
of study. Westad's work is at once international and in-depth. His work does not sacrifice
quality for breadth of topic. By comparing Cold War studies from the 1980s with contemporary
scholarship historians can trace the different approaches that have been used and cross-reference
sources to see how some points of view may have changed over time as new information became
available.

A juxtaposition of three approaches to one topic, the US-Saudi relationship, highlights
the variety of Cold War literature focused more explicitly on the Reagan years. First, a brief

return to Victory. In discussing Central Intelligence director Bill Casey, Schweizer writes: "To
4

Casey, the Saudis' concern about Soviet intentions presented a chance to make Saudi Arabia a
powerful ally of the United States. Oil was the mother's milk of industry, and the West needed

stable, secure access to reserves if there was going to be any economic recovery."4 This approach
assumes that the US and Saudi Arabia already agreed on regional security concerns, or at least

that both nations feared Soviet aggression. Just how close the two nations were in measuring the
possibility of aggression is disputed. Was the US really concerned that the Soviets would attack
Saudi Arabia? Or were the arms deals with the Saudi government more about securing low oil
prices? Schweizer writes, "By raising the issue of oil pricing and the US-Saudi security
relationship in the same conversation Casey was in effect saying that the two were related. It was
an element of the Reagan strategy. 'We wanted lower oil prices,' recalls [Secretary of Defense]

Weinberger. 'That's oneof the reasons wewere selling them arms.'"5 Thebipolar Cold War
approach described by Schweizer is challenged by other authors.
Because the Reagan Doctrine centers on a Cold War approach to diplomacy, removing

the Soviets from the US-Saudi relationship is impossible. However, adding other nations, thereby
diluting the importance of each state as the number rises, is quite possible. This is exactly what
Nicolas Laham does in his book, Selling AWACSto Saudi Arabia. Laham writes, "The oilfields

of the Persian Gulf were extremely vulnerable to air attack from any one of three major hostile

powers either in or nearthe region - Iraq, Iran, or Soviet military forces in Afghanistan."6 This
approach keeps the Soviets in play, but regionalizes the issue much more than Schweizer's

approach. Laham discusses at length the objections to the AWACS sale based on the apparent
instability of the Middle East in 1981. If another regional war occurred involving Israel, and the
US had already supplied the Saudis with high-tech weaponry in return for oil price stability,
where would American allegiance stand? Would it be based on regional alliances? Anti-Soviet

4Schweizer, Victory, 27.
5Schweizer, Victory, 31.
Nicholas Laham, Selling A WACS to Saudi Arabia: The Reagan Administration and the Balancing of
America' Competing Interests in the Middle East (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 2.

policies? Pro-Israel policies? Thankfully this is a counterfactual exercise, but the answers to
such questions were extraordinarily important at the time, and could very well give us insight into
how security decisions are made today.
The third approach to the US-Saudi relationship within the Cold War-Reagan literature

comes from the 2008 publication of Reagan, Bush, and Gorbachev: Revisiting the End ofthe
Cold War. Here the authors present an argument that diminishes the fear of Soviet aggression
even further. In discussing Secretary of State Alexander Haig, the authors write:
During April 1981, Haig toured the Middle East [...] What he sought above all
was agreement that Soviet expansionism comprised the chief threat to the Middle
East [...] Haig soon discovered that the Arab states regarded the issue of
Palestinian autonomy, not Soviet expansionism, the chief danger to regional
peace. Egypt made it clear that it had no interest in any anti-Soviet strategy for
the Middle East.7
This approach gives far greater credence to the concerns that Middle Eastern nations had over the
existence of Israel rather than the possibility of further Soviet expansion or aggression. But we
are still left with the same question that arises from any of these three approaches: in the event of

a crisis, where would US allegiance be? Would the US continue to play all sides? Would such
an approach even be feasible?

The final group of scholarship that informs this thesis concerns military history,
particularly arms dealing. This subject has been written about steadily over time, yet also shares
a similar flash point with Cold War literature: the fall of communism and the break-up of the
Soviet Union in 1991. Arms dealing studies exploded after the fall of communism, when the
arsenals of former Eastern Bloc and Soviet satellites began to unload their stockpiles for cash.
One prominent example of the pre-1991 literature is The Arms Bazaar by Anthony
Sampson. Because this book was published in 1977, the analysis is almost entirely focused on

the military-industrial complex of the superpowers and their allies. Chapters are separated by
region and theme, spanning the globe. Sampson writes, "With the end of the railroad boom the

7Norman A. Graebner, Richard Dean Burns, and Joseph M. Siracusa, Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev:
Revisiting the End ofthe Cold War(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 17.

steelmasters like Krupp, Vickers and Carnegie, who had built up whole cities in Essen, Sheffield
and Pittsburgh, looked elsewhere to fill their order books; and they looked to the industry which

was most profitable and which was also inthe vanguard ofinvention - to arms."8 That isto say,
the relationship between government and heavy industry during the Cold War was certainly

nothing new; the morality of profit never changes. Ultimately, Sampson finds, "The extension of
uncontrolled free trade, then and now, puts a premium on arms as the most liberated trade of all;

for it remains the unique characteristic of the arms traffic that it can expand its market rapidly and

almost indefinitely byplaying one side against the other."9 That scenario, asdescribed over thirty
years ago, has continued to endure.

One of the books to bridge the thematic gap between the US-Soviet arms race and the

post-1991 armory purges is The International Arms Trade by Rachel Stohl and Suzette Grillot.
The authors offer an introductory approach to arms dealing with a focus on what is currently

being done to track and manage the business of violence. One of the most glaring hypocrisies of
regulation comes from the fact that the five permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council (the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France) are also the world's five

largest arms dealers. The authors write, "Thus, their role in the internationalarms trade is central
to any larger discussion of the nature and consequences of the conventional arms trade, as well as
efforts to control them."11

Similar to Sampson, the authors note that one of the important changes in arms trading

over time is who actually makes the weapons. The authors write, "The first major trend in the
8Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar: From Lebanon toLockheed (New York: TheViking Press, 1977),
328.

9Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, 329.
10 The workof Stohland Grillot is muchcloser to a work of historythan some of the other populararms
dealing related books that have been published in the last ten years. The arms dealing lit itself is often
conjoined with studies of drug smuggling, organized crime, and even human trafficking. There are also
sub-genres that deal with the way specific weapons have been developed and dealt over time, most notably
the AK-47. Several studies already exist, including Larry Kahaner's AK-47: The Weapon that Changed the
Face of War and Christopher Carr's Kalashnikov Culture: SmallArms Proliferationand Irregular
Warfare. These books and their cousins tend to follow the international chronology of small-scale conflicts
and civil wars in which machine guns can win the day.

11 Rachel Stohl and SuzetteGrillot, The International Arms Trade (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 3.

modern arms trade system was the shift from private to government actors as the dominant

players."12 With governments at the crest of the arms trade, foreign policy andcommerce were
wed in a perfect match of profit seeking and paranoid diplomacy. While the overall value of arms
deals pales in comparison to agriculture or oil, for example, the ends that weapons facilitate are
far more valuable that the means to procure them. I explore how the Reagan Administration used
arms dealing as geopolitical strategy, ensuring their preferred negotiating stance.

The chapters are organized into three case studies, each representing a different level of
arms dealing: high-tech nuclear weapons, high-tech non-nuclear weapons, and low-tech
conventional weapons. Chapter one discusses the 1981 sale of advanced surveillance aircraft to
Saudi Arabia, known as AWACS (Airborne Warning Control System). The US alliance tapestry
in the Middle East made such deals controversial at best. But in 1981, several recent events

played important roles in policymaking, including the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
1979 Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, and the American economic hangover from oil crises
of the 1970s. In that atmosphere, the Reagan administration argued that protecting Saudi Arabia

and the oil they controlled was vital to national security, and therefore dealing sophisticated arms
to the Saudis was a necessary step in protecting the American way of life.

Chapter two deals with the basing of American Pershing II nuclear missiles in Western
Europe. The delicate balance of deterrence between Moscow and Washington was disrupted in
the 1970s when the Soviets deployed a new and highly advanced missile system in Europe, the

SS-20. The Reagan administration felt that the imbalance in nuclear forces in Europe constituted
a fundamental threat to the relative security of mutually assured destruction between the two
nations, and reaffirmed his desire to eliminate all nuclear weapons. As a result, Reagan pursued a

highly aggressive policy of confrontation with the Soviets in his first term in order to reset the
balance. In his second term, along with the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Reagan then

12 Stohl, Arms Trade, 16.

negotiated the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty, the first nuclear arms reduction treaty in
history.

Chapter three is a look at the complicated nature of Third World intervention, focusing
on the Contra War in Nicaragua. When Reagan took office in January, 1981, the Nicaraguan
government was run by a group called the Sandinistas. The Sandinistas were a power bloc of
Marxist-Leninists who took over the government of Nicaragua after a late-1970s revolution

against the ruling dynastic family. For Reagan, acquiescence to another communist nation in the
Western Hemisphere was unacceptable, and he blamed Jimmy Carter for ineffectually dealing
with Soviet adventurism in the Third World. By supporting anti-Sandinista forces, known to the

administration as "contras," Reagan tried to turn back the clock in Nicaragua to a time more
favorable to US interests. In doing so, Reagan had to fight public opinion, Congress, and near-

impeachment over the Iran-Contra Affair in order to achieve his policy goals in Central America.
Each case also represents a different approach to achieving diplomatic ends by varying
means, but all within the framework of dealing arms for political concessions. In the AWACS

case, the administration dealt arms bilaterally to the Saudis in order to solidify the alliance

between the two nations. By deploying the Pershing II missiles under NATO guidelines and
control, the administration worked within a multilateral framework. In doing so, they

strengthened the position of an alliance in which the US maintained the largest plurality of
material investment, while wringing concessions from an equally multilateral political opponent,
the Warsaw Pact, under direction of the Soviet Union. In Nicaragua, the administration supplied

non-governmental groups with weapons and communications equipment in order to destabilize
the anti-American government led by the Sandinistas. This effort was meant to force the

Sandinistas into allowing open participatory elections, at which point the administration
calculated that moderate democratic forces within Nicaragua would prevail, and return to a proAmerican government.

In formulating his foreign policy, Reagan borrowed from a myriad of previous precedents
and policy doctrines. From Truman's crusading in Greece to Kennedy's brinksmanship over
Cuba and Nixon's covert policies in Southeast Asia, Reagan embodied the culmination of

American Cold War ideology in the guise of an actor playing a politician. And although Reagan
experienced his share of ups-and-downs, for the most part, the American public loved him for his
confidence and rhetorical style.
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CHAPTER 1

LOUD AND CLEAR: REAGAN, AWACS, AND THE GRAND STRATEGY

"Let us beware that while they (the Soviet Union) preach the supremacy of the state, declare its
omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the Earth,
they are the focus of evil in the modern world." - Ronald Reagan, 1983
In February 1945, Franklin Roosevelt left the Yalta conference of the Big Three and
headed back to the United States. Along the way he stopped in Suez, and aboard a US Navy ship,
hosted a meeting with King Ibn Saud. During the meeting, Saud waxed kindly about the two
men's leg troubles. Roosevelt thought that Saud was better off since he still had partial use of his
legs. The King felt that Roosevelt was better off. Saud's legs were unreliable, but Roosevelt's
wheelchair could be counted on to take the president anywhere he wanted to go. As a gesture of

goodwill to the oldKing, Roosevelt gave him a spare wheelchair.13 The two leaders, if not
nations, were on equal footing, so to speak. Thus began the special relationship between the
United States and Saudi Arabia.

In 1981, Ronald Reagan offered the reigning Saudi king, Abdul Aziz, a very different
material package: the Airborne Warning Control System, or AWACS. Reagan's offer was tinged

with national confidence rather than personal humility, but the two presidential gestures were
intended to foster the same result: strengthen ties between the two nations in order to win a war
against a common enemy. The central aim of US-Saudi policy is to create regional stability in
order to protect the vast oil fields of the peninsula. To paraphrase Lord Palmerston, the US and

Saudi Arabia may not be eternal allies, but they do share permanent interests.
1979 was a tough year for the US interests in the Middle East, and even tougher for the

people of the region. Early in the year Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi fled Iran. In July the
brutal dictator Saddam Hussein took power in Iraq, and shortly thereafter started a war. In
November the Iranian revolution turned into a hostage crisis. That same month, the grand

13 Salim Yaqub, "The US and the Middle East During WWII" From The US and the Middle East: 19149/11. Read by the author. The Teaching Company, 2009.
11

mosque in Mecca was held hostage by Islamic fundamentalists for two weeks. In December the
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Even peace was contested among non-belligerents regarding

the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. Nothing seemed to be going right, and the
American electorate agreed. In November 1980, Jimmy Carter and his human rights-based

approach to diplomacy were replaced by Ronald Reagan in a landslide vote. It would not take
long for Reagan and his administration of foreign policy realists to seize the initiative in
southwest Asia and utilize arms deals to solidify diplomatic relations with two otherwise

antagonistic nations, Saudi Arabia and Israel. In doing so, the administration negotiated its way
into an enduring security-based position of dominating influence both politically and militarily.
In order to understand Reagan's AWACS policy, it is important to note that many of

Reagan's most visible policies were actually inherited from Carter, including arms negotiations
with the Saudis. Reagan's first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, writes, "The AWACS

controversy, as it came to be called, originated in the Carter Administration. [...] the outgoing
administration intended to sell the Saudis some form of radar surveillance aircraft or 'airborne

warning and control system' (AWACS)."14 The negotiations during theCarter administration
were never completed, but according to Haig, the promise between the Washington and Riyadh
was made. In the 1980 presidential campaigned, Reagan accused Carter of being ineffectual in
dealing with communism, especially in the Third World and the Middle East. The fact that no

deal was completed under Carter was the perfect opportunity for Reagan to argue publicly that
after the last four years, American credibility in the region was at stake. The administration
framed the debate within the context of honor and stability.

Historian Douglas Little described the difficulty of securing US interests in the Middle

East as the search for a modern Monroe Doctrine in the region.15 That is, a search for how theUS
government can protect vital interests in a specific geographic region. However, his treatment of
14 Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy. (Macmillan: NewYork, 1984), 174.
15Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 118.
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the issue does not account for the profound historical differences of the eras. Announced in
December 1823, the Monroe Doctrine was the brainchild of Secretary of State John Quincy
Adams, not President Monroe. The policy of the doctrine was meant to take advantage of the
mutual interest which Great Britain and the US shared in keeping other European colonial powers
out of the western hemisphere during the early nineteenth century. However, since the US was in
no position to enforce the doctrine militarily, the British navy filled that role. In the post-World
War II Middle East, the Saudis were playing the role of a weak but rising nation dependent on the
US military to enforce regional security. Therefore, Little's comparison between the two eras
fails to correctly reposition the US within the original parameters of the issuance of the Monroe
Doctrine.

The complicated history of American involvement in the Middle East, especially during
the Cold War, led to a tenuous situation as Reagan took office. Haig deftly summed up American
interests in the region looking forward from January 1981:
In pursuing the peace process, our goal was to strengthen and complete the Camp
David accords, which provided the best hope of preventing the outbreak of
another Arab-Israeli war. At the same time, we had to pursue our strategic
interests, finding ways to work with each of our friends in the region so that the
forces that threatened us all could be contained.16

Therein lay the problem facing the new administration: how could the United States satisfy all the
people all the time? What were American strategic interests? What was the force that
"threatened us all?" If consensus on a threat were found, what could the new administration do

about it? The answers to these questions were flushed out in the debate (approximately April to
October 1981) over whether or not the United States should sell advanced military and
surveillance equipment, most notably the AWACS, to Saudi Arabia. In completing the AWACS
deal, the Reagan administration was able to create a successful triangular diplomacy which
defined "red" Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and the "red" Shia Islamic revolution in Iran as

threats to regional stability, and thereby American interests.

The US agreed to supply the

16 Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (Macmillan: New York, 1984), 168.
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weapons needed to contain both threats simultaneously, while encouraging a third-party peace
between Israel and Saudi Arabia. It was never necessary that the Saudis and Israelis become
allies on their own: they were both allies of the United States and common enemies of the two
expansionist "red" ideologies threatening the region.

The Colors of Islam

Green has long been the traditional color of Islam. References to green clothes being

worn in paradise canbe found in the Qur'an.17 Thecolor green is used to decorate mosques,
graves, tombs, and other burial markers. In addition, the flags of over a dozen countries with
Muslim majorities contain the color green (even more than the crescent symbol), as does the fla£
of the Arab League and the Islamic Conference.

The association of the color red with Islam is much more contemporary. Historian Vali
Nasr traced the origin to a lay intellectual named Ali Shariati, and the mid-twentieth century
blending of Marxist and Islamic ideologies. Nasr writes, "Shariati was keenly aware of Shia
theology and history, but his worldview was shaped by Marxism and Third Worldism. [...] For
Shariati, the challenge was how to translate Marxist ideas into cultural symbols that the Shia
masses could relate to - how to make Marx go down easier by giving him a Shia coating, so to

speak."18 Red was the color of revolution, secular and non-secular, around the world during
Shariati's lifetime, including Marxist inspired revolts and those more broadly influenced by

liberation theology. Shariati therefore chose to label his interpretation of Islam as "Red
Shiism."19

17 Qur'an, Surah 76:21.
Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam WillShape the Future (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2006), 128.

19 Nasr, The Shia Revival, 129.
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The E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System
It is prudent to offer a brief explanation of what the AWACS plane can and cannot do.

The plane itself is a modified Boeing 707, labeled by the US Air Force as the E-3 Sentry. It does
not carry offensive weapons. According to the official USAF webpage, "The radar and computer
subsystems on the E-3 Sentry can gather and present broad and detailed battlefield information.
This includes position and tracking information on enemy aircraft and ships, and location and

status of friendly aircraft and naval vessels."20 In other words, the AWACS is the eyes and ears
of modern high-tech warfare in which information rules the day. Washington and Riyadh both
recognized the vulnerability of the rich oil fields surrounding the Persian Gulf, and moved to

protect them from a surprise attack. The AWACS planes were only meant to be the front line of a
broader defense network in the Gulf that covered air, land, and sea. However, the technological

capabilities of the AWACS could be applied to a much wider range of uses than national defense,
including spying or coordinating offensive attacks. Advanced surveillance equipment from both
the US and British had been used by various Middle East countries before 1981, most notably the
deployment of AWACS planes by the US to monitor unrest in Yemen during 1978-79. That

action was a favor between Washington and Riyadh, but on a small scale and under authority of
US forces. At the time of the AWACS debate in Congress, there was no agreement as to who

would be in charge of the planes in the air or on the ground. The only agreement was that the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan represented a threat to regional security.

The Soviets

Above all else, the Reagan administration saw the AWACS deal in Cold War terms. The

reason was not embodied in the deal itself, but in what the deal represented in the future. The
ends which the deal facilitated were far more valuable that the means to procure them.

20 United States AirForce, E3 Sentry (AWACS), November 20, 2009,
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=98 (accessed November 27, 2010).
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Weakening Soviet power and influence was the number one foreign policy goal of the
administration, and the best way to do that was to improve its alliance with the Saudis. Because

the Soviets and the Iranians both generated huge incomes from their nationalized oil industries,
driving down the price of oil was in the best interest of the US both as a stimulant to the US
economy, and as form of economic warfare against Moscow and Teheran.

By 1981, the US economy was in a deep recession, in part from the oil shocks of the
1970s, so strengthening ties with the Saudis allowed the US to solve multiple problems at once.

First, the US would gain access to cheap oil. The Saudis control the largest oil reserves on the

planet. As such, they have the ability to flood oil markets at times of their choosing. What the
Saudis lose in price per barrel, they make up in market share. Inexpensive oil drove down the
cost of industry in the US, which in turn helped stimulate the economy. Historian Douglas Little
explains, "By early 1990 US multinationals were paying just $18.00 per barrel for Middle Eastern
crude, a figure that, when discounted for inflation, translated into a price 25 percent lower than

the $11.65 that OPEC had imposed during the first oilshock seventeen years earlier."21 Referring
to a meeting between CIA Director William Casey and Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisl, former
Reagan administration lawyer Peter Schweizer writes, "By raising the issues of oil pricing and the
US-Saudi security relationship in the same conversation, Casey was in effect saying that the two

were related. It was an element of theReagan strategy."22
The public record supports Schweizer's position. In testimony to the Senate Foreign
Relations committee, Secretary Haig said, "many of our security assistance partners enjoy a
geographic proximity to the resources our economy demands. [...] As we strengthen these states,

we strengthen ourselves."23 President Reagan spoke even more forcefully, saying, "This sale will
significantly improve the capability of Saudi Arabia and the United States to defend the oil fields

1Little, American Orientalism, 73.
222Peter
Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan
Re
Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of
the
u Soviet Union (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), 31.

23 United States
St£ Department of State, Security and Development Assistance, Current Policy No. 264 March
19, 1981,2.
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on which the security of the free world depends."24 Reagan became famous for hisideological
bombast, and the public debate over the AWACS deal gave him the perfect opportunity to use his

talents. At a press conference in October 1981, Reagan said, "Saudi Arabia and the OPEC
nations there in the East - and Saudi Arabia is the most important - provide the bulk of energy
that is needed to turn the wheels of industry in the Western World, there's no way that we could

stand byand see that taken over by anyone that would shut offthat oil."25 Atthat time, the
"anyone" to which Reagan referred was the Soviets and the Islamists in Iran.

The second Cold War type of consideration attached to the AWACS deal, based on low
energy costs, was the increased size of the American tax base. A rejuvenated economy meant a
larger tax base, which could then be borrowed against in order to finance deficit spending on an

unprecedented military build-up.26 The new high-tech military could then be used to confront
Soviet aggression around the globe, including Afghanistan.

A third Cold War aspect of the deal was the ripple effect of an improved American
economy. In time, recovery from the recession strengthened the value of the dollar, which in turn
gave the Saudis greater purchasing power with its oil revenues (paid in dollars) thereby
completing the circle of dependency. With an increased national income, and a tighter alliance
with the US, the Saudis were willing to support American interventions around the globe. The

most obvious was in Afghanistan, where the Saudis were all too happy to aid their Sunni Muslim
brothers in jihad against the atheistic communists. Here, the Saudis and Iranians shared a
common threat, but no direct alliance. Historian Odd Arne Westad explains, "The slogans and

the worldview of the Iranian Islamists, purged of its Shia vocabulary, fitted the purpose of the

24 Ronald Reagan, Public Papers ofthe President ofthe United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981 (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1982), 867.

25 Reagan, PPP, 873.
26 Stanley L. Engerman andRobert E. Gallman, eds., The Cambridge Economic History ofthe United
States Volume 3: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 334. The
authors make it clear that the bureaucratic structure (also known as the Iron Triangle or Military-Industrial
Complex) was already in place when Reagan took office. What is more important is the sheer size of the
bureaucracy during the Reagan administration.
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Afghans well: the creation of an Islamic state, the stress on Islamic internationalism, and the
condemnation of the godlessness and materialism of the superpowers gave a larger purpose to

what might have been an incongruous alliance."27 Riyadh also contributed to a CIA shell
corporation, the Human Development Fund, to help the administration pay for the Contra war in

Nicaragua.28
A final Cold War facet of the AWACS deal was that manipulating world energy markets

undercut the potential earnings of both Moscow and Tehran, limiting their ability to grow
economically. Arms deals were second only to energy as Soviet exports, but the Soviet Union
relied desperately on access to western technology and industrial patents to upgrade its
infrastructure. The American position during the summer of 1981 was to constrain Soviet
economic leverage over the West, and not allow the transfer of Western technology that increased

Soviet war-making capabilities.29 The US putpressure on its Western European allies to delay a
Soviet natural gas pipeline, and moved into the realm of science fiction style sabotage. In June
1982, an American early warning satellite detected an explosion in Siberia, the heart of the Soviet
energy economy. A gas line had exploded in such a grand fashion that it was visible from space.
The apparent cause of the malfunction was what has become known as a "logic bomb." In this

particular case, agents of the CIA pre-altered software which Soviet agents then stole while
operating in Canada. In time, the automation program ran its course, and because of manipulated

program script, caused a pressure overload in the pipeline, which burst with great fury.30
Schweizer writes:

The 'resource crisis' that the Soviet leadership faced in the 1980s was not caused
by American policy; it was inherent in the system. But what is only now
emerging is the fact that the United States had a comprehensive policy to

27 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 307-308.
Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne, eds. The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (New
York: New York Press, 1993), 384.

29 US Department of State, AStrategic Approach to Foreign Policy, Current Policy No. 305 August 11,
1981,4.

30 "War in
in the Fifth Domain", The Economist, July
J
3, 2010, 25.
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exacerbate this crisis. That policy took many forms: hidden diplomacy, covert
operations, a technically intense and sustained defense buildup, as well as a series
of actions designed to throw sand in the gears of the Soviet economy.
T

1

The US sought to keep the Soviet energy industry as inefficient as possible and lower income

potential by espionage and economic warfare, thereby exacerbating existing problems within the
Soviet system.

These four relationships between the Cold War and the AWACS deal constitute a large

part of the overall Reagan "Grand Strategy" to move away from detente and containment of the
Soviet Union, to an outright effort to "win" the Cold War. The culmination of these and other

policies are expressed in National Security Decision Directive 75, "US Relations with the
USSR," issued in January 1983. In part, the Decision reads, "U.S. objectives are: Above all, to
ensure that East-West economic relations do not facilitate the Soviet military buildup. This

requires prevention of the transfer of technology and equipment that would make a substantial

contribution directly or indirectly to Soviet military power."32 However, the single greatest threat
to a successful completion of the AWACS deal was also one of America's greatest Cold War
allies: Israel. I will discuss Israel's concerns below, but first a look at the Shia revival and its

effect on regional stability in the Middle East.

Red Islam

While the Reagan administration considered the AWACS deal to be first and foremost a
Cold War issue, the Israeli and Saudi governments saw the AWACS deal in regional security

terms. As noted above, 1979 was a distinctly unsettling time in the Middle East. 1980 brought
little relief. Saddam Hussein saw the chaos of the Iranian revolution as an opportunity to expand

Iraqi national interests at the expense of his neighbor. Hussein wanted control of the Shatt-al-

Schweizer, Victory, xiii.

32 National Security Council, "National Security Decision Directive 75: US Relations with the USSR,"
Federation ofAmerican Scientists http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html (accessed 28 October
2010).
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Arab waterway at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers which formed the border
between Iraq and Iran. To secure this position, in September 1980, the Iraqi military invaded
Iran. The result was a near-decade long war of bloody attrition (1980-1988) in which the US

supplied weapons to both nations.33 Hussein and his army were not able to capitalize onIran's
internal chaos, and instead, the Iranians rallied against a common enemy and slowly turned the
tide of battle into a stalemate. In the process, the "red" Shia Islamists consolidated power and
secured the gains of the revolution within the borders of Iran.

Until 1979, the conservative Sunni Muslim majority in Saudi Arabia had been the most

active group within Islamic global community. Saudi Arabia is home to the two holiest cities of
Islam, Mecca and Medina. Mecca is the home of the Grand Mosque and the Kaaba, and the
destination of the Haj, or pilgrimage, one of the five pillars of Islam. When Muslims pray five
times a day, they physically look to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi's brand of conservative "green"
Islam was visible throughout the world. The Saudi monarchy funded madrasahs and Islamic
missionary work not just in the region, but globally.

For the House of Saud, the competition between Sunni and Shia sects for control of Islam
itself was at stake after the revolution. Westad observed, "Khomeini's return to Teheran and the

Islamic Republic he proceeded to set up visualized the existence of an alternative focus of

opposition, in which temporal justice derived from the word of God and not exclusively from the
decisions of men. Islamism provided an ideology centered on the Third World itself, through

which both Western projects of modernization could be condemned."34 The Iranian Revolution
was a revolt against secular nationalism and modernization. The conservative Saudis were

33 Through the course of the Iran-Contra Affair it became known that the US wassupplying Iranwith spare
parts for the arsenal of American weapons that were co-opted in the 1979 revolution. The US was also
supplying Iran with new weapons, including anti-tank weapons. At the same time, through the "Bear
Spares" program, the US was supplying Iraq with replacement parts and maintenance gear for the Soviet
arms already in its arsenal. The US also supplied Iraq with agricultural credits and satellite reconnaissance
photos of Iranian troop movements. For more information see the testimony of former National Security
Council member Howard Teicher in United States ofAmerica v. Carlos Cardoen, et al, case number 93241-CR-HIGHSMITH, January 31, 1995, United States District Court - Southern District of Florida.

34 Westad, Global Cold War, 295.
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selective in their modernization projects, but like pre-revolutionary Iran, they actively sought to
modernize their militaries. When asked about the possibility of revolution in Saudi Arabia, and a

subsequent repetition of American material losses in Iran, Reagan was clear: "I have to say that

Saudi Arabia, we will not permit to be an Iran."35 The Saudis were also concerned about internal
security following the Grand Mosque takeover in November 1979, the same month that the
revolution in Iran was turning into a hostage crisis. As an example of monarchial fortitude in

maintaining internal security, sixty-eight of the Islamic fundamentalist perpetrators of the Grand
Mosque take-over were publicly beheaded in various parts of the country.
For the Saudis, conservatism meant stability, something Reagan could appreciate. In an

ongoing effort to tie the security of Israel to the stability of the region, Reagan said, "[I]t is
essential that we show the Middle East that we are prepared to participate there in trying to bring

peace and in aligning ourselves with the moderate Arab states, as well as we have with Israel."36
When the Reagan administration officials spoke of supporting moderate states in the region, what
they really meant was supporting conservative Sunni majority states which opposed the radical
Shia majority state of Iran. Unfortunately for the people of Israel, and for the success of
Reagan's Middle East peace plan, Green Islam, like Red Islam, condemns the existence of the
state of Israel. This situation put Iran and Saudi Arabia in an awkward position, creating an

exception to the oldest rule of Realpolitik: the enemy of an enemy was not a friend. Because of
the opposition between "red" and "green" Islam, the two nations could not coordinate their
objections to the state of Israel in any meaningful way.
The success of the Iranian Revolution, however, did far more than secure the sovereignty
of an Islamist state. Westad writes:

The Iranian revolution was a watershed for both superpowers in their encounters
with the Third World. For the United States it meant that Communism was no

longer the only comprehensive, modern ideology that confronted American
power. [...] For the Soviets, Khomeini's victory meant that the Marxist theory of

35 Reagan, PPP, 871.
36 Reagan, PPP, 918.
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Third World revolutions had encountered significant problems: the left was
supposed to supplant 'clerical reaction' as the alternative to imperialist

exploitation, not the other way around.37
This framing makes it easy to see that the addition of a revitalized and global-reaching
ideological movement in no way replaced either of the existing superpower economic structures.
Washington and Moscow shared a common threat to their enlightened modernization projects.

And yet, for the Americans and the Soviets, much like Red and Green Islam, the enemy of an
enemy was a friend to neither. The American policy stance in September 1981 was based on a

fear of anarchy in Iran. Regarding the buffer status once held by Iran between the Soviet Union
and the Persian Gulf, Haig testified, "The danger to Iran's independence and integrity poses a
threat to U.S. security that would make Iran's own wanton assault on international order pale by

comparison."38 Without knowing whether or not the Iranian Revolution would be secure, thetwo
superpowers reacted to the disruption of the status quo in the Middle East in very different ways.
Moscow sent an army, while Washington sent arms.

The geography of the Shia diaspora is key to understanding Saudi and superpower
responses to the new Islamist state. In describing the success of the Iranian revolution, Nasr

writes, "Khomeini used the emotional power of Shia lore and imagery not only to help him seize

control of Iran but to lay claim to Shiism's very soul. In the process he also made Islamic
fundamentalism a political force that would change Muslim politics from Morocco to

Malaysia."39 Shia Muslims are a numerical minority to Sunni Muslims globally. However, Shia
are concentrated in key geopolitical areas of the Middle East and Central Asia. The greatest body
of Shia are in Iran, but a large number of Shia also live along the Persian Gulf coast from Qatar
north through the oil fields of Saudi Arabia, into Kuwait and southern Iraq, then crossing into Iran
and the north shore of the Gulf. The diaspora also extends north from Iran into Central Asia
along the coast of the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan, and north of India including parts of Pakistan,

37 Westad, The Global Cold War, 299.

38 US Department ofState, US Strategy in the Middle East Current Policy No. 312, September 17, 1981, 2.
39 Nasr, The Shia Revival, 121.
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Afghanistan, and China. There are also small but substantial populations of Shia in the former
Soviet states of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Moscow feared that Khomeini's message would

spread quickly, undermining Soviet influence in the region. Geography and demography were
two of the key factors in the Kremlin's choice to invade Afghanistan in December 1979. By

doing so, the Soviets hoped to check the expansion of the Islamist movement and reassert their
own hegemony in Central Asia.

One American response to the Iranian Revolution was to re-examine the "Twin Pillar"

policy for stability in the Middle East. Former National Security Council member Howard
Teicher explains, "During the administration of President Richard Nixon, Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger devised a security strategy which became known as the 'Twin Pillars' policy.
This policy relied upon two regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, to protect important

American interests in the Persian Gulf."40 The loss of Iranas a regional allyneeded to be
remedied, and the Reagan administration believed that confirming and strengthening the existing
alliance with Saudi Arabia was the first step. Secretary Haig testified to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, "Our approach to Saudi Arabia has been shaped by the profound insecurity

caused byevents ofthe last 5 years, particularly the fall ofthe Shah."41

Israel

From its inception as a nation-state, Israel has had to fight for survival. It fought at least
one major war with at least one (though often more) Arab state in the 1940s, 50s, 60s, and 70s.
To a large extent, the US has worked to guarantee Israel's security, most notably during the
October War in 1973. After initial military successes by Egypt and Syria in the Sinai and Golan

Heights, the US agreed to supply Israel with material support while also working on a cease-fire
agreement. The long term result was the Camp David Accords and a "land for peace" deal

40 Howard Teicher andGayle Radley Teicher, Twin Pillars toDesert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in
the Middle East from Nixon to Bush (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1993), 17-18.

41 US Department of State, US Strategy in the Middle East, Current Policy No. 312, September 17, 1981, 3.
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between Israel and Egypt. However, Camp David was not popular with other states in the region,
and for a time all but three Arab nations broke diplomatic relations with Egypt.
The Reagan administration considered regional stability as the best defense for Israel.
Tel Aviv agreed, but did not share Washington's view of how to achieve stability. The
administration argued that, like Israel, Saudi Arabia must be able to defend itself. Washington
preferred a balance of power model in the Middle East, although not necessarily in equal
distribution among its allies. Security for Israel meant the ability to defend itself against multiple
Arab states at once, regardless of whether or not a potential belligerent was an American ally.
Tel Aviv preferred clear military superiority, which would serve as a deterrent to any first strike.
The administration was sympathetic to Israel's position on security, but not at the cost of its own
alliances.

Reagan was undeniably consistent in his regional stability message. He was asked time

and again about the controversial AWACS sale, and nearly every time he attached the security of
Israel to the stability of the region, and the stability of the region to completing a deal with the
Saudis. Discussing the proposed deal at a news conference, Reagan said, "It poses no threat to

Israel, now or in the future. Indeed, by contributing to the security and stability of the region, it

serves Israel's long-range interests."42 In an effort to show broad support for the AWACS deal,
Reagan invited a distinguished list of former cabinet officials and national security advisors to

publicly back the package. In a joint statement, both Henry Kissinger and former Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown offered their take on the situation, in the positive. Kissinger said, "I
believe the sale is in the national interests of the United States; it is compatible with the security
of Israel; it is essential for the peace process in the Middle East; and it is important for the

President's ability to conduct an effective and credible foreign policy."43 Kissinger's

42 Reagan, PPP, 867.
43 Reagan, PPP, 889. The statement in support of the AWACS sale reads: "The sale of AWACS and other
air defense equipment to Saudi Arabia would make a substantial contribution to the national security of the
United States in a vital part of the world. The rejection of this sale would damage the ability of the United
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endorsement was a particularly sweet victory for Reagan. Historian Jeremy Suri writes, "His

[Kissinger's] successors, including Ronald Reagan, condemned Kissinger's emphasis on limits,
but they continued to draw on the diplomatic networks and the maneuvers of force that he

pioneered."44 Both Carter and Reagan had been elected in reaction against the detente era of
Nixon and Kissinger. Both Carter and Reagan based their politics on ideology over realism. The
difference was that while Carter's ideology was rooted in human rights broadly defined, Reagan's

ideology was built on anti-communism. However, in this case Reagan and Kissinger agreed on a
realist vision of the situation in the Middle East based on a balance of power.

For its part, Tel Aviv was unconvinced by the Reagan administration's framing of the
debate. In September 1981, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin traveled to Washington to

join the lobbying effort against the AWACS deal in Congress. He was not alone, as Bandar bin
Sultan had been sent by the Saudi royal family to Washington as well. Begin argued that Saudi
Arabia was an unstable nation with radical elements in key positions, and that adding AWACS to

their Saudi Royal Air Force would put Israel at a defensive disadvantage. Begin complained that
Saudi Arabia had not accepted the Camp David Accords, which was offered as proof that the
Saudis did not favor peace in the region. At one point, the public discourse over the AWACS
sale devolved to the point where Reagan felt compelled to assert that, "[W]hile we must always
take into account the vital interests of our allies, American security interests must remain our

internal responsibility. It isnot the business ofother nations tomake American foreign policy."45
Begin and Bandar were not alone in their efforts. The pro-Israel lobby was working

vociferously on behalf of Begin and the Jewish state, and the Saudis hired veteran lobbyist and

States to conduct a credible and effective foreign policy, not only in the Gulf region, but across a broad
range of issues." This statement was endorsed by: Kissinger, Brown, Melvin Laird, Robert McNamara,
Elliot Richardson, Donald Rumsfeld, James Schlesinger, Zbigniew Brzenzinski, McGeorge Bundy, Gordon
Gray, Walt Rostow, Brent Scowcroft, General Lyman Lemnitzer, Admiral Thomas Moorer, General
Maxwell Taylor, and William P. Rogers.

44 Jeremy Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge, MA: TheBelknap Press, 2007),
247-248.

45 Reagan, PPP, 867.
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former John F. Kennedy Legislative Affairs assistant Frederick Dutton to parry the

aforementioned group. In terms of the American legal process, in order to complete sale, at least
one house of Congress was required to approve the deal. The House of Representatives would
have no part in backing the arms package. The Senate was malleable, but approval was far from
assured.

The Domestic Debate

Michigan Senator and member of the Armed Services Committee, Carl Levin, wrote to

National Security Advisor Richard Allen in April 1981, expressing his concerns over the
AWACS deal. In part, Levin argued that without details as to who would be in control of both
the planes and the information gathered therein, it would be difficult to support any arms
package. Senator Levin asked:

Who is going to be in command of the aircraft and will they be Saudi aircraft
with Saudi markings? Will the American personnel follow orders issued by the
Saudis, or will they follow only those orders issued by an American officer?
What command relationship will be established aboard the aircraft between the
Saudi and the American officers in charge of the personnel? Will the American
officer have the authority to refuse or countermand a request or order by Saudi

officers or authorities either in theair or onthe ground?46
Two internal White House memos confirm the significance of Senator Levin's questions.

National Security Council member Geoffrey Kemp wrote, "I think it would be unwise for the
White House to answer in writing his good questions in too much detail at the moment, since we

don't' have all the answers at this time!"47 NSC member Bob Kimmitt agreed. In response to
Kemp, Kimmitt wrote that the White House, "should send only a general response to Levin" and

that "we should also avoid statements that will only serve to encourage another Levin letter."48
The White House had no tangible answers to Levin's question at the time, so they chose rhetoric

46 Letter, Carl Levin to Richard Allen, April 24, 1981, WHORM: FO 003-02, Ronald Reagan Library.
47 Letter, Geoffrey Kemp to Richard V. Allen, April 28, 1981, WHORM: FO 003-02, Ronald Reagan
Library.

48 Letter, BobKimmitt to GeoffKemp, April 28, 1981, WHORM: FO 003-02, Ronald Reagan Library.
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and obfuscation. At this early stage of the public debate, a majority of Senators were unwilling to
accept the administration's position.
Led by a conservative senator from Oregon, Bob Packwood, both Democrats and

Republicans in the Senate openly challenged the President's position. In a June 1981 press
conference, Senator Roger Jespen complained that before the Iranian Revolution, the Senate
Armed Services Committee assured the US Government that while the Shah was in danger,
American weaponry was not. Senator Packwood stated that, "Our interest is best served by a
permanent peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Saudi Arabia is an impediment to that

peace." He also bemoaned that Saudi Arabia was responsible for raising the price of "our oil."
Senator Henry Jackson argued that allowing Saudis to control the AWACS planes and

information was an affront to other American allies. Jackson wondered, "Why apply to the
Saudi[s] an authority we don't give to NATO?" The signers of the Packwood Resolution felt that

Israel already had a military that was adequate enough to keep the Soviets out of the region and
that the real threat to Saudi Arabia was internal.49

Many people, both in and out of government, expressed fears that Israel's security would
be threatened by arming the Saudis. As a result, both the White House (WH) and State
Department (DOS) worked to build support for the deal and assuage fears of worst case scenarios.
In one exchange, a DOS official wrote, "Israel already has a highly effective air defense system

[...] as well as defensive missile and gun systems. Any attack by Saudi Arabia on Israel would

be prohibitively costly."5} The "prohibitively costly" argument was included as part of a standard
response form to Congressmen who were concerned with Israel's security, including letters to

Representative William M. Broadhead of Michigan, and Senator RudyBoschwitz of Minnesota.51

49 Press Conference on Saudi Arms Sale, June 24, 1981, WHORM: FO 003-02, Ronald Reagan Library.
50 Letter, William J. Dyess toWilliam J. Lowenberg, June 18, 1981, WHORM: FO 003-02, Ronald Reagan
Library.

51 Letter, Richard Fairbanks to William Broadhead, June 29, 1981, WHORM: FO 003-02, Ronald Reagan
Library; Letter, Max L. Friedersdorf to Rudy Boschwitz, August 7, 1981, WHORM: FO 003-02, Ronald
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This indicates that the Reagan administration had substantial confidence in ability of the Israeli
military to defend itself as long as the status quo was upheld.

By taking control of the public debate and tying Israeli security to regional stability,

Reagan was able to convince the Senate to approve the AWACS deal with a vote of52-48.52

The Qualitative Edge

Maintaining the 1981 conditional balance of Middle East militaries meant that if the US
dealt AWACS to the Saudis, the Israelis would have to be compensated as well. In order to

placate Begin and the Knesset in Tel Aviv, the Reagan administration offered a substantially
increased arms package to Israel following the passage of the AWACS deal. A close examination
of the evidence indicates that this is likely what both the Israeli and US Governments had been
working toward throughout the debate.

Hidden in the public discourse over the AWACS deal is a continuity of language
regarding the American-Israeli security alliance. In framing the public debate, the Reagan
administration argued: both Israel and Saudi Arabia needed to be able to defend themselves
against outside aggression, whether it be communist or fundamentalist, and yet simultaneously
not become embroiled in an armed conflict between one another despite the subsequent regional

arms buildup. The link between the two nations was an interest in regional stability, and access
to the United States arsenal. The answer for how the Saudis could protect themselves was clearly

embodied in the AWACS package, but the Israeli situation was more subtle. In an April 1981

correspondence, one DOS official wrote, "since the October 1973 war, a central feature of U.S.
policy has been to assure fully that Israel retains qualitative military superiority in the region."
In a near echo that sentiment, a WH official wrote in May 1981, "A central feature of US policy
since the October 1973 war has been to assure that Israel retains a qualitative military

52 Nicolas Laham, Selling AWACS toSaudi Arabia: The Reagan Administration and the Balancing of
America's Competing Interests in the Middle East (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 122.

53 Letter, Joseph W. Twinam to Leib Orlanski, Undated, WHORM: FO 003-02, Ronald Reagan Library.
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superiority."54 The way to ensure such superiority was to promise an increase in arms sales to
Israel in anticipation of successfully completing the AWACS deal with the Saudi government.
According to Secretary Haig, there was some understanding between Washington, Tel
Aviv, and Riyadh from the outset. In his memoirs, Haig recalls the situation as one of bad timing

and press leaks. He wrote that as early as February 1981, Reagan, Begin, and Israeli Foreign
Minister Yitzhak Shamir were in agreement that, "the United States would supply to Israel an

extra squadron of fifteen F-15's at a cost of $300 million; in return, the Israelis would mute their

opposition tothe sale ofarms, including anaerial surveillance capability, tothe Saudis."5'
Shortly thereafter, there was a leak in the Israeli press which exaggerated the capabilities of the
AWACS plane, making the Israeli public very uneasy. While Reagan had just won an election in
three months before, Begin was in the middle of a campaign. Once news of the AWACS deal
went public, both the Begin and Reagan administrations lost control of the debate for a time, only
coming together again in agreement after the deal passed through the US Senate.
This agreement has not gone unnoticed. One historian wrote, "Despite the Begin

government's vocal protests against the AWACS deal, the Reagan administration never attempted
to use arms transfers to Israel to provide itself with leverage. During months of debate, it did not
raise the prospect of an interruption in American weapons supplies to the Jewish state if the Begin

government continued to object to the sale."56 Other historians have noted that"in recognition of
Israel's strategic importance to the Middle East, the president refused to condemn that country for
its air strikes against Soviet-equipped missile bases in Syria or its preemptive destruction in 1981

of a nuclear energy installation in Iraq."57 These observations provide at least some
circumstantial evidence to back up Haig's claim of equal arms compensation for Israel. In June

54 Letter, R.V. Secord to JoeBroder, May 14, 1981, WHORM: FO 003-02, Ronald Reagan Library.
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1981 the executive director of the Palestinian Congress of North America wrote to President
Reagan concerning the Iraqi nuclear installation attack by Israel. In response, a DOS official

defended Israel, writing, "Israel contends that its action against Iraq was a necessary, legitimate
act of self-defense because the Iraqi reactor was intended to produce weapons grade material to
make atomic bombs. Israel also points out that there is a state of war between the two countries
and contends that Iraq had made clear its intention to produce such a weapon for use against

Israel."58 This position indicates that public condemnation ofIsraeli belligerence was merely
diplomatic protocol, and that the strategic relationship between the Tel Aviv and Washington
remained fully intact.

Both Haig's and Reagan's public statements throughout 1981 confirm an underlying
agreement regarding the security of Israel. As early as March 1981, Haig told the Senate, "We

are determined that Israel retain the military capability to deter threats from hostile forces.

Moreover we recognize the importance of Israel to ourdeveloping regional strategy."59 In
September 1981, the Secretary reiterated the point. In discussing the AWACS deal, Haig stated,

"Our approach has also been shaped, however, by an appreciation of Israeli concerns over the
proposed Saudi package. We are taking steps to alleviate these concerns. We are determined to

maintain thequalitative edge that is vital to Israel's security."60 In early October, just weeks
before the vote in the Senate, Haig spoke as forcefully as ever, saying, "The United States is
fundamentally and unalterably committed to the security of Israel. For our part we are
determined to take steps to minimize any adverse impact of the sale and to maintain the

qualitative edge upon which Israel depends."61 On October 17Reagan told reporters, "[W]hen
Mr. Begin left here after his visit, and I told him what we were going to do, he told me he was

58 Letter, Dean E. Fischer to Said Arikat, July 16, 1981, WHORM: FO 003-02, Ronald Reagan Library.
59 US State Department, Security and Development Assistance Current Policy No. 264 March 19, 1981, 2.
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going to maintain hisposition buthe was notupset at all."62 If true, this statement goes even
further toward backing up Haig's argument that there was already some agreement about
compensation from the beginning. In the midst of an election campaign, and with public
sentiment in Israel against the AWACS deal, Begin had no choice but to maintain his disapproval

of the arms sale to the Saudis. Reagan and his administration, understanding that, continued to tie
Israeli security with regional stability, trying to make the best out of a bad political situation.
Knowing that an improved arms package for Israel would be the result of a Senate approval of the
Saudi AWACS package, both men rode out the debate as professional politicians do. The result

was that Reagan's AWACS deal passed in the Senate and Begin's Likud party was re-elected to a
majority in the Knesset, albeit by one seat over Shimon Peres and the Alignment party.
Some of the strongest evidence in support of the prior-agreement argument comes from a
litany of correspondence between WH and DOS officials, and members of Congress. As early as

May 1981, WH officials assured, "We are planning to seek Congressional approval to provide
Israel with a significant increase in defense credits for 1983 and 1984 to cover the cost of
additional defense equipment. Earlier, acquisition of this equipment was deferred due to

insufficient funds."63 This sentiment was expanded and used in response to concerned citizens as
well as Congressmen as a standard form content block. The text of the argument reads:

We are planning to seek congressional approval to provide Israel with additional
military sales credits of $300 million in each of the fiscal years 1983 and 1984.
These credits will enable the Israelis to purchase additional air defense aircraft or
other equipment they have deferred because of their difficult financial position.
These funds would be added to the already substantial military and economic
assistance program for Israel, and should total over $2.8 billion in fiscal year
1982. We believe that Israel will be able to maintain its qualitative edge, and
will remain capable of defeating any combination of Arab forces. We will also

work closely with Israel to counter the Soviet threat.64

62 Reagan, PPP, 950.
63 Letter, R.V. Secord to JoeBroder, May 15, 1981, WHORM: FO 003-02, Ronald Reagan Library.
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Seeking Congressional approval is certainly not the same thing as having approval in hand, but
this clearly shows that the administration was deeply committed to supplying Israel with all the
weapons necessary to maintain its military advantage in the region, and guarantee its ability to
defend itself against multiple hostile nations at once.
The combination of the "prohibitively costly" argument, with the proposed increase in
aid to Israel, can be found in two sources, both coming directly from the White House. In a
September 1981 talking points memo, the WH position was stated as:

This package will not pose any substantial threat to the security of Israel. Each
of the four elements in the Saudi air defense enhancement package has been
carefully tailored to ensure that it makes good military sense without providing a
capability which exceeds Saudi needs. The limitations of the various elements,
including AWACS, and the growing superiority of the Israeli Air Force, will
preclude Saudi Arabia from ever posing any credible threat to the security of
Israel.65
The second piece of evidence is a form letter sent by Reagan to four Senators just before the
October 1981 vote on the AWACS deal. In the letter Reagan wrote:

I am confident that the Saudi AWACS will pose no realistic threat to Israel. I
remain fully committed to protecting Israel's security and to preserving Israel's
ability to defend against any combination of potentially hostile forces in the
region. We will continue to make available to Israel the military equipment it
requires to defend its land and people, with due consideration to the presence of
AWACS in Saudi Arabia.66
These two positions, in combining the "prohibitively costly" argument with the
"qualitative edge" argument must be unpacked in two different ways. First, the weapons being
delivered to both countries need to be examined in relation to each other. The AWACS plane has

no offensive weapons, and therefore relies on fighter planes like the F-15 for protection in the air.
Increasing the number of fighter jets in the Israeli Air Force (IAF) meant that in the event of a
Saudi-Israeli or Arab-Israeli armed conflict, the IAF would have a sufficient force to counter the

airborne protection of Saudi AWACS, and neutralize the threat to Israel by disrupting the flow of

65 Letter, Richard V. Allen to Ronald Reagan, September 12, 1981, WHORM: FO 003-02, Ronald Reagan
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battlefield information to Saudi military commanders. However, should the Saudis face a
military threat from Iran or some other belligerent, the Saudi Royal Air Force could be expected

to perform admirably thanks to the advanced tracking and communication afforded by the
AWACS. Second, the chronology of arms deliveries served to ensure Israel's qualitative military

edge over the relative defensive capability increase of Saudi Arabia upon receiving the AWACS.
The increase in arms to Israel took place in 1983 and 1984, while the delivery of AWACS to the
Saudis was completed in 1985. In response to a concerned member of Congress, WH official
Richard Fairbanks wrote:

Because the AWACS aircraft would not be delivered until 1985-1986, the Saudis

do not require fully trained crews immediately. Our plans envision Saudi
AWACS flight crews becoming fully trained in a few years through a
combination of US military and contractor trainers. In addition, Saudi
dependence on US contractors for maintenance for the more complex sub
components of the system will give us additional control over the AWACS

aircraft and systems for the life of the system.67
This means that the Reagan administration and the US military saw the AWACS deal as a

revenue stream, as well as a geo-strategic move. By withholding certain technologies from the
Saudis, the administration set up a perpetual relationship which bound Riyadh to play by
Washington's rules as long as they wanted their new surveillance aircraft to function properly in
the long run. The same is true of the increased arms package to Israel. The long term

maintenance and spare part sales to purchasing countries are what make arms sales so lucrative in
the long term, in addition to the up front cost of purchase. Secretary Haig explains, "After many
months of public debate and public diplomacy and private emotionalism, the following was
accomplished: Saudi Arabia received nearly everything it had asked for in the way of defense

systems and armaments, and so had Israel. No other outcome ever was possible."68
With support for Israel's qualitative military edge secured, Reagan and his cabinet were
free to pursue their larger geostrategic goals pertaining to the Soviet Union, many of which were
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based on the ability of low energy costs to stimulate the American economy, which in turn funded
the new high-tech arms race. Reagan came into office with a 'never again' attitude toward the oil

crises of the 1970s and argued for a reassertion of America's military might in order to negotiate
with the Soviets only and ever from a position of strength. Reagan also used the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan as proof of outside threats to the Middle East, which led to an increasingly
antagonistic approach to Moscow and the belief that agents of the USSR were to blame for all the
major disruptions in the world. Further, the Iranian Revolution and its aftermath created a

situation in which Reagan could claim that not only was the Middle East under threat of Soviet
military aggression, but that the stability of the region as a whole was disrupted by the possible

anarchic situation in the early years of the revolution. Instability has been the enemy of the US
since the beginning of the Cold War, and even further as antithesis to the Open Door policy. It

had long been US government policy that political instability allowed for communist subversion,
and after 1979, for Islamic fundamentalism. In order to keep both adversarial ideologies in

check, the administration carried out two comprehensive arms packages for two very unlikely
allies-by-proxy in Israel and Saudi Arabia. Reagan's triangular diplomacy was successful in the
long term because of the inability of Tehran or Moscow to form alliances of their own to
challenge America's diplomatic and military dominance in the region.

Over the course of Reagan's presidency, largely through multi-national organizations
such as NATO and the UN, the US transformed the failed Twin Pillar policy into a four-corner

policy that included Israel in the west along with three conservative Sunni states: Saudi Arabia in
the south, Turkey in the north, and Pakistan in the east. Geography and demography were just as
influential to American policy in the Middle East as they were to the Soviets. The special

relationships which were forged during, and in the aftermath of, World War II were nurtured by
every president from FDR to Reagan and beyond. The mettle of these Israeli-American and
Saudi-American alliances was put to the ultimate test during the 1991 Gulf War. In an American
dominated multilateral action, and in the absence of a strong Soviet response in the last days of
34

the Cold War, the US was able to protect its vital interests in the Gulf, ensure Saudi security, and
keep Israel out of the war, all while rolling back Iraqi gains and restoring stability to the region.
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CHAPTER 2

TRUST, BUT VERIFY: REAGAN, GORBACHEV, AND THE INF TREATY

"Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the
slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by miscalculation, or accident, or by

madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us."69
-

John F. Kennedy, 1961

On December 8, 1987, President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail

Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) which aimed to eliminate short

and medium range nuclear weapons from their respective national arsenals. It was a small but
significant step in the long process of easing Cold War tensions between the United States and the
Soviet Union. However, when Reagan first took office in 1981, this outcome was far from
inevitable, and by the end of 1983, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were

as fragile as they had been since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The potential for
brinksmanship endured well into Reagan's tenure, despite previous efforts at detente by both
governments. The great success of Reagan and Gorbachev was their agreement in Geneva,

Switzerland in 1985 to put aside all other policy issues and agree that, since it cannot be won,
nuclear war must never be fought. This may see to be an obvious conclusion, but to put such an
agreement into practice required eliminating the means of deterrence. As such, John F.

Kennedy's warning to the United Nations continues to ring as true today as it did in 1961, or the
1980s for that matter.

This chapter is a discussion of the relationship between the deployment of two types of
intermediate (medium) range missile systems in Europe, how leaders on both sides viewed the
situation, and how the potential use of such weapons affected superpower relations during the last
decade of the Cold War. These events led to the signing of the INF Treaty, which embodies two

important concessions by both national governments. First, by eliminating an entire class of

69 John F. Kennedy, Address to the United Nations General Assembly September 25, 1961, American
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nuclear weapons, and significantly reducing the total number in existence, Reagan and Gorbachev
decreased the likelihood of a nuclear domino effect exchange whereby a tactical or medium-range
attack might lead to full scale retaliation. At its core, the INF Treaty represents an agreement that

the prospect of intercontinental annihilation trumps the reality of regional provocation. There is
no need for short or medium range nuclear weapons when mutually assured destruction (MAD) is

the foundation of a global nuclear peace. Second, in an effort to merge their rhetorical
understanding with the reality of the Cold War, both leaders agreed to a verification schedule
backed up by the potential for unilateral nuclear action if the treaty was violated. In a modern
retelling of the old paradox, to secure lawful enforcement of the INF Treaty which aimed at
preventing war, both nations reserved the right of mutually assured destruction.
The most recent Cold War scholarship tends to portray the positive personal relationship

between Reagan and Gorbachev as key to building trust and understanding between the US and
Soviet governments. Gorbachev is further singled out for his role in the partnership for two

reasons. The first reason is chronological. Gorbachev was the last leader of the Soviet Union,
and his time in office began after Reagan had already been elected for the second time. By this
reasoning, Gorbachev is the difference maker because change happened on his watch. Similar
arguments have been made about Reagan, too. This line of thinking is based on the idea that
Reagan and Gorbachev were simply in office at the culmination of decades' worth of policies on
both sides, the totality of which initiated a shockingly abrupt end to the Cold War under
Gorbachev, and the break-up of the former Soviet empire less three years after Reagan's

successor George H. W. Bush took office.70

70 Historians Melvyn P. Leffler and John Lewis Gaddis discuss the importance of Gorbachev as an
individual within the Soviet system based on his unique combination of intelligence and opportunity.
Leffler and Gaddis each note that Gorbachev's access to education, and foreign travel in particular, allowed
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made when traveling spurred his openness to change in an effort to raise the standard of living within the
Soviet Union. After having seen three consecutive Soviet leaders die in office, Ronald Reagan finally found
an enthusiastic negotiating partner in Gorbachev. Both Leffler and Gaddis argue that the two men truly
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The second reason Gorbachev's contribution is emphasized is more complicated to
isolate, but is more or less a result of Gorbachev's personality, his intellect, and an openness to

change. In describing the atmosphere just after the Geneva Summit, preeminent Cold War
historian John Lewis Gaddis wrote, "Two years earlier [Yuri] Andropov had thought Reagan
capable of launching a surprise attack. Now Gorbachev felt confident that the United States
would never do this. Reagan's position had not changed: he had always asked Soviet leaders to

'trustme.' After meeting Reagan, Gorbachev began to do so."71 Byarguing thatReagan "had
not changed," Gaddis implicitly makes the case that Gorbachev was the only one of the two who
could break the deadlock of mutual antagonism. On Gorbachev as an individual, Gaddis wrote,
"He chose love over fear, violating Machiavelli's advice for princes and thereby ensuring that he
ceased to be one. It made little sense in traditional geopolitical terms. But it did make him the

most deserving recipient ever of theNobel Peace Prize."72
Historian Melvyn P. Leffler also portrays Gorbachev as the central figure, highlighting
his intellect and internationalism. During the 1970s Gorbachev worked for the Communist Party

on improving the Soviet agricultural infrastructure, which allowed him the rare freedom to travel
outside the country, and, in particular, to the West. Gorbachev, Leffler explains, "Liked talking

to foreigners, exchanging ideas, and making comparisons between his way of life and theirs. He
felt pride in the Soviet educational system. He believed his countrymen had better access to

medical care and superior public transport system. But his travels abroad bred doubt."

Leffler

describes Gorbachev as "extremely personable and engaging, but he was also tough and
intelligent." His intellect allowed him to "recognize from the outset, that his domestic goals could
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not be achieved without readjusting Soviet foreign policy."74 In this observation, Leffler and
Gaddis are in agreement. Gaddis argues that Gorbachev's open mindedness freed him to

"[sweep] away communism's emphasis on the class struggle, its insistence on the inevitability of

a world proletarian revolution, and hence itsclaims of historical infallibility."75 Gorbachev's
charming curiosity did not go unnoticed by Western leaders. After meeting Gorbachev in 1984,
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously observed, "This is a man with whom I could
do business."7

Gaddis and Leffler are representative of revisionist Cold War historians who have made
the leap to post-revisionism. The opening of eastern European archives, in addition to a running
stream of memoirs, and the release of Soviet internal documents for public consumption, has

infused a tangible sense of excitement to recent Cold War research. Today's scholars have much
greater access to information than ever before. Combined with a new emphasis on globalization
in writing American History, that access has fed a growing number of Cold War reexaminations.
Historian Jeremi Suri has also written about the end of the Cold War. In a 2002 article,

Suri explained the end of the Cold War by borrowing a concentric circle analogy from James Joll.
In his description, Suri noted that Reagan was, "the man largely responsible for the crisis

atmosphere" of 1983, but that after a series of tense events throughout the year, "Reagan made a

decisive turn toward improved Soviet-American relations."77 Like Gaddis and Leffler, however,
Suri also holds a special place for Gorbachev, arguing that:

Gorbachev understood that his hopes for improving the Soviet economy and the
quality of domestic life in general required a peaceful international context.
Continued Cold War competition would perpetuate that social stagnation he
wanted to eliminate. Only extensive and unprecedented East-West cooperation
could permit the allocation of resources necessary for domestic restructuring

(perestroika).78
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Suri framed the relationship as one between two individuals who want the same thing, but

approach it from two different directions. Reagan is the paranoid ideologue always searching for
peace through strength, while Gorbachev is the pragmatist, willing to expend political capital in
order to bring about change.
What all of these historians have in common is the belief that Reagan and Gorbachev

were both men of their time and circumstance. They were both moral and rational, and they
sincerely liked one another. The absence of pretension in combination with an open style of
dialogue helped foster an honest rapport between the two, which in turn helped thaw Cold War
tension from the top down. Their meeting, however, was far from inevitable, and the path leading

to the INF signing date in December 1987 was fraught with near misses and real tragedy. From
Reagan's point of view, the Soviet SS-20 deployment during the late 1970s was a clear attempt to

tip the balance of power in Europe away from the West. Once in office, he worked to respond
multilaterally through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by supporting a plan to
match the Soviet nuclear threat.

First Mover Advantage

Proper balance is the key to enduring power relationships. Regarding Europe in the early
years of the Cold War, that meant the overwhelming number of conventional Soviet forces was

offset by the American "nuclear umbrella" which protected NATO allies. That is, if leaders in
the Kremlin decided to take advantage of the situation by advancing militarily against Western

Europe, American and NATO leaders could retaliate with nuclear weapons to offset their
numerical disadvantage versus the oncoming force. However, this balance was based upon the
idea that the Soviet military would be the aggressor. From Moscow's point of view, NATO

leaders' first strike option was always nuclear, which meant a Soviet conventional force
advantage was only as good as an enemy's reluctance to use nuclear weapons.

40

As weapons technology improved during the Cold War, this conceptual balance itself
was shaken by the introduction of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Since it was no

longer necessary to be anywhere near a target in order to hit it, conventional forces were no

longer a first-strike option when the expected retaliation is overwhelming missile retaliation.
Under the threat of intercontinental MAD, the number of divisions the Soviets had in the

European theatre was irrelevant, since ICBMs could beused as the great equalizer of the 20th
century. The debate over what constituted "balance" and "security" in Europe, and whether or

not the two were linked, was an ongoing one throughout the Cold War. One group of historians
put is this way:

Thirty years of successful containment in Europe had never resolved the
perennially divisive military dilemmas inherent in the [NATO] alliance. The
heavy reliance on nuclear weapons, as the only effective and affordable deterrent
and guarantee of peace, placed Europe completely under the decision-making
power of the United States. Washington alone would determine how Europe

would be defended during any hostilities.79
The limited technology of bomber jets and artillery helped secure the initial NATO view of the
balance, but considering the accelerated rate of research and development in the post-World War
II world, it could never last.

The steadily increasing total number of nuclear weapons led to another serious Cold War
concern: anti-ballistic missile technology (ABM). The desire to possess a reliable ABM system
is directly related to the size of an enemy's nuclear arsenal. If one side believed it could

eliminate the other's ability to counter attack by launching a first strike, then it would be rational
to strike first. It is the ability to retaliate which maintains balance. If one nation began
developing the ability to defend against a first strike, it would be in the best interest of a
belligerent nation to launch an attack before the defense system was operational. Otherwise, once
the defender's shield is in place, they could strike with impunity. This is the logic behind the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 banning such technology, signed by Richard Nixon and

79 Norman A. Graebner, Richard Dean Burns, and Joseph M. Siracusa, Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev:
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Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev. The ABM treaty represents the spirit of detente, a lessening of
tension between the superpowers. The US interpretation of detente was overtly shattered during

the Jimmy Carter-Leonid Brezhnev years by Soviet interventionism in the Third World, and by
the time Reagan took office in January 1981, there were proxy wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua,
and Angola.

In Europe during the detente period, Soviet leaders chose to deploy a new kind of missile,
the SS-20. Its capabilities were astonishing: the SS-20 had a target range of three thousand miles,
carried multiple nuclear warheads, and was capable of being launched from highly mobile

platforms. The SS-20 deployment was a strategic move, a threat, that if either the US or any of
its NATO allies attacked the Soviet Union or any of its Warsaw Pact allies, massive retaliation

could be a reality for any or all of them, some within just a few minutes. In order to make their
threat credible, the Soviet government made sure that the deployment was observable. There is

no benefit to developing weapons of deterrence if the enemy you hope to deter cannot confirm the
danger. The threat was then backed up by a promise that the SS-20s were defensive in nature, but
would be launched in retaliation of a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union or any of the

Warsaw Pact nations. The promise of retaliation is a promise to do something that a rational or
moral leader would not normally do: participate in nuclear war. The promise to use SS-20s was

an observable, credible threat to regional security in Europe, and the world.

In deploying the SS-20, the Soviet government shifted the balance. In 1981, former
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy wrote:

Experts have been found to doubt the comfort for Europe in each successive
American doctrine, whether of massive retaliation, or flexible response, or the
seamless NATO Triad. And Soviet threats of all sorts, political and military,
conventional and nuclear, actual and hypothetical, have intermittently strained
the balance. It endures.80
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By November 1987, Moscow had deployed four-hundred seventy medium range missiles,

capable of striking from North Africa to Scandinavia, from either side of the Ural Mountains.81
Independent of the Soviet development of the SS-20, American military contractors

designed a nearly equivalent missile system: the Pershing II. The history of the Pershing II
research and development dates back to 1974, but the real import of the system was not relevant

until 1979 when NATO approved basing of the Pershing lis in West Germany in response to the
SS-20 threat. However, two years passed before the program entered the production phase. By

that time the Soviet military was integrating two new SS-20s perweek into their arsenal.82
When viewed from the Soviet perspective, the Pershing II system was just as unsettling
as the SS-20 system was to NATO allies. The Pershing II is also a ground-mobile, surface to

surface, nuclear weapon system, but has a range of only one thousand miles. By deploying the
Pershing lis in West Germany, the target zone included every Warsaw Pact nation, as well as the
highest concentration of Soviet civilians (west of the Urals), and Moscow itself. Former
Secretary of State Alexander Haig recalled that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, "made

the expected point that the SS-20s and other Soviet nuclear systems targeted on Europe did not

threaten US territory, but the Pershing II would be within range of major Soviet cities."83 This
situation is similar to putting the American eastern seaboard within range of Soviet nuclear forces
which Washington argued was unacceptable during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

81 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding theEstablishment of theData Base for theTreaty Between
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, December 8, 1987,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/inf/text/inf3.htm (accessed December 14, 2010). This document includes
information on the total number, and the maximum range, of both American and Soviet missiles, including
the SS-20 and Pershing II. The geographic range mentioned in this paper simply fits the listed range
capabilities.

82 Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: MacMillan, 1984), 225.
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Because of the uneven research and development timelines of the two missile systems,

the actual deployment of the Pershing II can be viewed, by logic of chronology, as a reaction to
the deployment of the SS-20s, but this deployment was not guaranteed. There are, of course, at
least two ways to react to any sequential move situation: action or inaction. Since the research
and development of the two missile systems was independent, their existence alone cannot be
considered as a reaction to the other. In military terms, Washington wanted the option of

peaceful destruction of the SS-20s as a military threat. In political terms, by arguing for the
elimination of the SS-20s, Washington was asking Moscow to retract its retaliatory promise
implicit in the threat, which would return the balance in Europe back to the pre-detente status

quo. In order to achieve that end, Washington had the choice to respond to the SS-20 deployment
by either basing Pershing lis in Western Europe (action, or hard line approach), or relying on the
existing countermeasures already in place (inaction, soft line approach) and negotiate the
elimination of the SS-20s from the existing position. The debate over how to return to the NATO
preferred definition of balance in Europe split Reagan's cabinet.

Soft Line vs. Hard Line

The soft line approach to removal of the SS-20 threat was called the Zero Option. The
debate over the Zero Option effectively pitted Secretary of State Alexander Haig against

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. In his memoir, Haig wrote that:
The fatal flaw in the Zero Option as a basis for negotiations was that it was not
negotiable. It was absurd to expect the Soviets to dismantle an existing force of
1,100 warheads, which they had already put into the field at the cost of billions of
rubles, in exchange for a promise from the United States not to deploy a missile
force that we had not yet begun to build and that had aroused such violent
controversy in Western Europe. Caspar Weinberger, in his enthusiasm for the

Zero Option, could notconcede thispoint.84
Haig suggested an aggressive response to the SS-20s as quickly as possible. If the US
government were able to counter with deployment of the Pershing II system in a short period of
Haig, Caveat, 229.
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time, then the Soviet government would be forced to react in kind, continuing the cycle of the
existing arms race. By emphasizing the financial cost of SS-20 deployment over the danger it

represented as a weapon, Haig shows that he was willing to accept the status quo MAD in order
to fight the Soviets economically. He felt that Moscow could no longer match the US in

financing the Cold War arms race, and this was a clear opportunity to attack the irrationality of
their economic system, rather than the rationality of their leaders. Haig felt that the only way the
Soviets would not cheat a verification treaty was if the US had a comparable threat to the SS-20
in the field.85

Early in the debate, Weinberger clearly saw the situation differently. Like Haig, he never
doubted that the Kremlin would need some sort of incentive to destroy its SS-20s, but Weinberger

felt that the mere existence of a comparable missile system would be enough, and that actual
deployment would be unnecessary. However, Weinberger's position was contingent on two
points. He writes:

By the first of the two, the Soviets would not only remove the SS-20s, but would
actually destroy them. That was important because the SS-20s were mobile.
[...] The other essential, I felt, to any treaty on any subject with the Soviet Union,
was through on-site verification. [...] Meanwhile, I did not feel we should stop
our work on the Pershing lis or the cruise missiles. I felt that there would be no
possibility of the Soviets agreeing to take out their SS-20s, unless, and until, they

had the kind of inducement that deployment of the Pershing lis would bring.86
Weinberger felt that existing systems were enough deterrence in the field, but wanted to prepare
for, rather than commit to, future missile deployment. He had faith that submarine-based
missiles, F-l 11 bombers, and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile systems (ICBMs) would be

enough incentive for Moscow to back down from this particular engagement, provided that

Washington continued moving forward with the research and development of the Pershing II.87
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Haig warned Reagan that the Zero Option, "was a mistake that he would have to modify

within theyear."83 Weinberger was pleased that Reagan at first favored theZero Option, butlater
recalled, "Haig need not have feared, because to the President's disappointment and mine, the

immediate reaction was almost all negative."89
If the Zero Option best represents the soft line approach, then the NATO Dual Track
policy best represents the hard line point of view, with a caveat. The Dual Track was an attempt
to combine both military (hard line) and political (soft line) policies in a shrewd move. Track one
was a direct deployment response to the SS-20. In December 1979, as noted above, NATO
leaders approved the basing of Pershing II missiles in West Germany, and ground launched cruise
missiles (GLCMs) in the Netherlands, Belgium, England, and Italy. In December 1981, the
Pershing II program entered the production phase, and by June 1984, deployment of the first
Pershing II battalion was complete.
Track two accompanied Track One. Throughout the latter process Western leaders
maintained an open position on negotiating the elimination of SS-20s with leaders from the
Kremlin. By leaving the Soft Line approach open, both Reagan administration and NATO
officials could claim to be advocates of pragmatic arms control at the least, and benevolent arms

reduction at the best. If successful, the Two Track policy would achieve the NATO definition of
balance either way. From the Soviet point of view, this was an aggressive move which put
Moscow at risk of total destruction within ten minutes of a launch.

The Public Sphere
The Dual Track policy ostensibly showed that leaders in both Washington and NATO

saw no change in the overall precarious nature of Cold War deterrence. The ultimate deterrence
was the ability to retaliate against any first strike, whether it occurred in Europe or elsewhere.

mHaig, Caveat, 229.
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However, this position was terrifying to many Europeans, as well as people who held
philosophical disagreements with the existence of nuclear weapons altogether. The only way to
test if Washington would sacrifice New York for Paris is for Paris to be destroyed first - every
time.

Since both Soviet and American governments made threats of full scale retaliation if an

ally were attacked, MAD had to be considered a credible threat because of the cost of testing an
opponent's resolve. This line of thinking put an extraordinary amount of pressure on the US
government to back up its allies with independent deterrents. If Western Europe was a target,
then NATO allies needed to be able to strike back independently of the US, hence the necessity of
NATO countries having Pershing II missiles and GLCMs on site. The question of whether or not
American leaders were willing to risk New York to defend Paris could be eliminated by giving
NATO leaders the ability to retaliate on their own. Failure by NATO to retaliate, or the
incapability of retaliation, could still be overridden by the potential of Washington to strike on
their behalf with ICBMs. The basing of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe merely reset the
regional balance of terror.

Palpable concerns over the use of nuclear weapons drove many people to demonstrate
against their very existence. By 1982 people were marching by the thousands in Chicago, and
hundreds of thousands in New York. The Catholic Bishops of America spoke out against the

arms race as immoral. And by the end of 1982, the anti-nuclear movement was active in forty-

three states.90 Europeans were just as concerned, if not more so, considering first strike
possibilities. In just one month, the number of protesters in Bonn, London, and Paris numbered

overhalfa million people.91
A visual representation of the nuclear freeze movement was published in newspapers

across the US in July 1985. The image shows a small, single missile silhouette representing all

90 Graebner, et al,Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev, 32.
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the bombs dropped in WWII contrasted against 6,667 tiny silhouettes representing the current
collective nuclear arsenal of the world. The accompanying text included sobering statistics about
the potential destructive power of the US and Soviet arsenals, encouraged people to contact both
President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev in support of upcoming summit talks, and asked,

"How long canwelive with the arms race?"92
If Reagan's hard line approach to the Cold War was terrifying to the people in the freeze
movement, it was reassuring to people who believed in his concept of a position of strength. In a
letter to the President in 1984, Charls Walker of the private interest group Committee on the
Present Danger expressed his support for Reagan and his policies:
As you have long recognized, bad arms control agreements are worse than none
at all. Equitable arms control agreements could play a part in insuring U.S.
security - but whether the Soviets are prepared to enter into equitable agreements
is subject to doubt. Today, with the military balance precariously tipped against
us, America's security is directly dependent on growing strength in our defense
forces.93
The idea that "bad arms control agreements are worse than none at all" was shared by many, but

this concept holds inherent logical fallacies. This idea is a moralistic one, in which the US only
participates in the arms race in a reactive way, rather than as the first cause. If there is a legally
binding treaty, then both parties must answer to the letter of the law. But in the absence of a
treaty, value judgments rule the day, feeding the nuclear hysteria rather than fostering peaceful
negotiation.

Many Congressmen, both Republicans and Democrats, recognized this problem, and

encouraged Reagan to make the necessary efforts to find common ground with Soviet leaders.
Republican Senator Larry Pressler wrote to Reagan, pleading, "we owe it to the world" to

negotiate, and that suspended talks "would not be in the interest of anynation."94 Shortly

92 Letter, Joan B. Kroc to Ronald Reagan, July 12, 1985, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald Reagan Library.
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thereafter, a group of Democratic House Representatives encouraged Reagan to be less
confrontational, and more diplomatic. They argued that it was, "in the interest of all mankind that

serious bilateral negotiations be resumed."95
A group of Republican Senators led by Malcolm Wallop and Jesse Helms co-signed a
letter to Reagan regarding the administration's policy of recognizing the parameters of the un
ratified SALT II treaty. They asked, "Shall you continue to abide unilaterally by treaties and
agreements that the Soviets have violated and that have expired anyhow? Unilateral compliance
is unilateral disarmament." These Senators argued for the negative, and they rejected the tit-fortat strategy of matching Soviet treaty infractions. Wallop, Helms, and the others agreed, "that
option would give the Soviet Union control over what we do and don't do, and, above all, keep
our defense planning within a framework that is fundamentally wrong."

Reagan, of course, agreed that a world free of nuclear weapons would be a world much
improved. Yet the reality was that no one, no matter how much power they wielded, had the

ability to simply call for the destruction of a nuclear arsenal. There were too many overlapping
interests involved, and always the balance of power to consider.

This point is perhaps best summed up by former diplomat Miles Copeland in his seminal
work, The Game ofNations. He writes, "when vital national interests are at stake, and when it is
a question of seeing them endangered or bowing to some high moral principle, there is no

question butthat it is thehigh moral principle which will suffer."97 The endangered high moral
principle in this case is that the mere existence of nuclear weapons is immoral. The paradox is

that ifjust one belligerent nation possesses nuclear weapons, it is immoral not to possess them for
your own nation. This paradox of politics and morals is as old as time. In trying to serve the best
interest of a nation in a world in which some other leaders behave immorally, behaving morally

may put you at a disadvantage, and therefore threatens the best interest of your nation. Reagan

95 Letter, BillGreen to Ronald Reagan, February 10, 1984, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald Reagan Library.
96 Letter, Malcolm Wallop to Ronald Reagan, June 4, 1985, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald Reagan Library.
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confirmed as much in his State of the Union address in 1985, stating, "We cannot play innocents

abroad ina world that's not innocent."98 When it comes to the nuclear arms race, behaving
morally is immoral when you are in a position of power, unless and until another nation has the
capability of MAD, at which point morality once again takes over. This kind of theoretical
wordplay is difficult to impart to the masses when the consequences of miscalculation could

mean the end of civilization as they know it. Fear is much easier to convey than reason. In
looking across the oceans at one another, both nations saw danger.

The Mirror Image

The years between Reagan's first election and the ascendency of Gorbachev to General
Secretary were some of the darkest days of the Cold War. The atmosphere led many people to

believe that escalation was the only constant, and that the cruel teleological path of a nuclear arms
race could only lead on one horrifying conclusion. Reflecting on the tension in early 1980s,
Gorbachev wrote, "This was [...] a time when many people in the military and among the

political establishment regarded a war involving weapons of mass destruction as conceivable and

even acceptable, and were developing various scenarios of nuclear escalation."99 In hismemoirs,
Reagan recalled that, "I carried a small plastic-coated card with me, [which] listed the codes I
would issue to the Pentagon confirming that it was actually the president of the United States who
was ordering the unleashing of our nuclear weapons. The decision to launch the weapons was
mine alone to make."100

Assume for a moment that Reagan's statement about being solely responsible for
ordering a nuclear strike is true, and that everyone from the top down wouldyb//cw such an order.
If the Soviets withdrew their SS-20s without some combination of threat or concession from

98 Ronald Reagan, Public Papers ofthe President ofthe United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985 Volume I
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Washington, they would appear weak, and lose credibility in their reputation as hardliners. In the

absence of economic power, political will backed by military reputation is the strongest feature of
any government, and therefore indispensible. Whatever the NATO response would be to the SS20 deployment, short of nuclear war, Moscow could not blink. To do so would indicate less-

than-total faith in the choice to deploy the SS-20s. In the resulting geo-political atmosphere,
every situation involving either the US or Soviet Union was highly scrutinized and presented as
proof of the others' aggression or intransigence.
In the collaborative effort The Sword and the Shield, historian Christopher Andrew
describes the Soviet position early in the Reagan administration. Andrew writes, "In a secret
speech to a major KGB conference in May 1981, a visibly ailing Brezhnev denounced Reagan's

policies as a serious threat to world peace."101 At the same conference, KGB Director Yuri
Andropov announced operation RYAN (Raketno YadernoyeNapadenie, "Nuclear Missile
Attack"). Andrew continues, "RYAN's purpose was to collect intelligence on the presumed, but
non-existent, plans of the Reagan administration to launch a nuclear first strike against the Soviet
Union - a delusion which reflected both the KGB's continuing failure to penetrate the policy

making of theMain Adversary and its recurrent tendency towards conspiracy theory."102
By 1983, Brezhnev had passed away and Andropov was the new General Secretary.
Unfortunately, Andropov's health upon entering office was not much of an improvement over

Brezhnev's later years, and the paranoid view of Washington continued unabated. In describing
Andropov and the political climate of 1983, historian Vladislov Zubok writes, "On September 29,
Pravda published his 'farewell address' on Soviet-American relations. Andropov informed the
Soviet people that the Reagan administration was set upon a dangerous course 'to ensure a

101 Christopher Andrew andVasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the
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dominating position in the world forthe United States of America.'"103 Previous to his duties as
General Secretary, Andropov had been the longest serving head of the KGB, and he was well
aware of the American government's geopolitical strategy and capability. Based on American
actions, not words, Andropov made a good point.
For his part, Reagan was all too happy to play the insult game, and consistently derided
the Soviet Union in public. In a speech to the British House of Commons, Reagan warned that
"the march of freedom and democracy.. .will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of

history."104 In his first term, Reagan famously labeled the Soviet Union an"evil empire" and
warned people not to "remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and

evil."105 George Kennan, the father of US containment policy called Reagan's views toward the

Soviet Union "intellectual primitivism."106
Reagan also compared Soviet leaders to their most bitter of antagonists, the Nazis.

Winning the "Great Patriotic War," as the Soviets called World War II, was the greatest source of
national tragedy and pride. In a March 1981 interview with Walter Cronkite, Reagan said, "I
remember when Hitler was arming and had built himself up - no one's created quite the military

power that the Soviet Union has, but comparatively he was in that way."107 It was not theonly
time Reagan associated the Soviets with their World War II adversary. In a speech to Congress,

Reagan compared the Soviet communist influences in Central America and the Caribbean with

German U-boats operating in theGulfof Mexico during the early 1940s.108 In describing the
current Soviet leadership as similar to Nazi leadership, Reagan was verbally salting the psychic
wounds incurred by millions of civilians. As one historian has noted, "Probably no American
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policymaker at any time during the Cold War inspired quite as much fear and loathing in Moscow

as Ronald Reagan during his first term aspresident."109

The Year of Living Dangerously

In January 1983, Reagan made antagonizing the Soviets official policy when he signed
National Security Decision Directive 75 (NSDD 75), titled "US Relations with the USSR."
NSDD 75 is the written representation of Reagan's concept of a position of strength. The policy
calls for the US to challenge the Soviet Union militarily, subvert the authority of the Kremlin
within the USSR, and at the same time always extend an olive branch to negotiate should the first

two points aggravate Soviet leaders to the point of exhaustion on any particular issue.
The most successful portion of this policy, and also potentially the most dangerous, was
its military strategy. In part, NSDD 75 reads:

The US must modernize its military forces - both nuclear and conventional - so
that the Soviet leaders perceive that the US is determined never to accept a

second place or a deterioratingmilitary posture. Soviet calculations of possible
war outcomes under any contingency must always result in outcomes so
unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no incentive for Soviet leaders to

initiate an attack.111

This line of thinking is contingent upon two very precarious assumptions, the first of which is
being able to guess how Soviet leaders "perceive" a situation, and, second, what their
"calculations" might be if US policymakers correctly determined the answer to the first

assumption. Reagan added to this policy in a statement to Congress in June 1985, when he said it
was necessary to, "make it clear to Moscow that violations of arms control obligations entail real
costs," and that the US should continue with strategic modernization programs "as a hedge

against the military consequences of [...] Soviet violations of existing arms agreements whichthe
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Soviets fail to correct."112 When the two doctrines are combined, the situation reads likethis: if
Washington guesses wrong on Soviet perceptions of any given situation, and then Moscow reacts
in a way that US officials did not anticipate, then US officials reserve the right to respond in a titfor-tat fashion based on the Soviet reaction, even though it was Washington's failed model that
allowed for the unanticipated reaction. This "miscalculation" portion of Kennedy's 1961 warning
was a real possibility in 1983.
Growing concerns over the arms race combined with a brutal economic recession led to
very low public approval numbers for Reagan during this period. After two years in office, the
financial slowdown that Reagan had blamed on Carter was still lingering, which led some to
question whether or not incurring a large national debt to finance a military modernization project
was good policy. According to a Gallup Poll, Reagan began 1983 with a paltry 35% approval

rating.113 In July 1983, Republican Senator Arlen Spector addressed this concern in a letter to
one of Reagan's national security assistants, William P. Clark. Regarding the prospects of a new
arms control summit with the Soviets, Spector wrote:

Even if the summit did not produce an agreement, I do not believe it would 'dash
expectations,' as some suggest. Rather, a meeting between the two leaders
would demonstrate that both nations are serious about arms control. Such a

demonstration is crucial, in my opinion, to maintaining public support for our
defense build-up, strategic modernization, including the MX missile, and

deployment of the Euromissiles.114
By taking this position, Specter was effectively arguing that, in a democracy, informed public
opinion is less desirable than manipulated public opinion. Specter felt that a mere facade of good
faith negotiations would be enough to drum up public support for the real bargaining target of the
administration: a position of strength.
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The tension continued to rise into late summer of that year when a Soviet fighter pilot
shot down Korean Airline Flight 007 over the Kamchatka peninsula in far eastern Russia. KAL
007 had gone off course and mistakenly entered Russian air space. The fighter pilot did not
intend to kill civilians, and in fact thought he was shooting at an American military plane. The

US regularly probed Soviet radar defenses, including in the area around Kamchatka where a
major Soviet naval base was located. Tragically, after a series of technical and communications
problems, in the black of night, the fighter pilot was ordered to shoot down the plane. Only
afterwards was the real identity of the craft known. Western journalists and politicians alike
criticized the attack as naked aggression, and a representation of the contempt for human life held

by leaders in Moscow.115
The timing could not have been worse. The KAL incident occurred in September,

followed by weeks of demagoguery in the press. In the midst of all the posturing, both public and
private, Reagan approved a ten day NATO military exercise called Able Archer '83 from
November 2-11. Author David Hoffman explains:

The exercise, Able Archer '83, was designed to practice the procedures for a fullscale simulated release of nuclear weapons in a European conflict. The Soviets
had long feared that training exercises could be used as a disguise for a real

attack; their own war plans envisioned the same deception.116
Able Archer was exactly the kind of operation that RYAN was meant to detect and counter,

which only heightened tensions between the two nations, as well as the apprehensiveness of
European allies on both sides. In carrying out the exercise, NATO forces altered their message
formats and moved non-existent forces to high alert status. KGB agents monitoring the
communications and the exercise as a whole were shocked, and for a time believed that NATO

was on theprecipice of a first strike against the Soviet Union.117 In response, during the exercise,

115 David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous
Legacy (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 94.
116

16 Hoffman, The DeadHand, 72-79..

117

James Mann, The Rebellion ofRonald Reagan: A History ofthe End ofthe Cold War(New York:
Viking, 2009), 77-78.
55

the Soviet Fourth Air Army was also placed on an increased readiness level, and combat air
operations were called off for seven days in anticipation of NATO moves. Reagan was initially
scheduled to participate personally, but after word of Soviet and allied apprehension got to the

White House, he decided against it.118 The successful completion of a mock-nuclear missile
attack only reinforced the idea that the scenario was a viable option for policymakers. Both sides
believed the other was capable of a first strike.

Despite the mounting fear and polarization caused by the events of 1983, Reagan still
clung to the NATO Dual Track policy, which necessitated Pershing II deployment. In response
to a letter signed by sixteen Congressmen warning of the "increasingly dangerous" situation, a

White House aide wrote on behalf of the Reagan, that the "President believes that making
concessions just to get the Soviets back to the negotiations that they themselves broke off would

only encourage further intransigence."119 Reagan's negotiating policy never changed. It was
"no" to any proposal by the Soviet government that was less than the American starting position.
Gorbachev, on the other hand, was the first of the two leaders to act on the recognition of both
men that the exorbitant amount of time, money, and resources being used for an international
arms race could be of far better use within the borders of their own country. Gorbachev believed

the benefits to the Soviet Union from ending the arms race would outweigh any security concerns
inherent in disarmament. This recognition, and acceptance, is what made Gorbachev so
important in the INF Treaty negotiations.

Personality Goes a Long Way

The inability of Washington and Moscow to foster some level of trust between the two

governments in the early 1980s is clear. Both nations were scared of what they saw on the other
side of the world. The only reason that neither nation acted on their fear is the concept of MAD.
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An American economist and professor, Thomas Schelling , articulated this point in his book The
Strategy ofConflict. Schelling wrote:
There is a difference between a balance of terror in which either side can
obliterate the other and one in which both sides can do it no matter who strikes

first. It is not the "balance" - the sheer equality or symmetry in the situation that constitutes mutual deterrence; it is the stability of the balance. The balance
is stable only when neither, in striking first, can destroy the other's ability to
strike back.120
The choice by Soviet leaders to deploy SS-20s within range of Western Europe, when taken from
the NATO point of view, upset the regional stability of that balance. Open criticism on both

sides, coupled with massive intelligence and military exercises like RYAN and Able Archer, only
served to exacerbate the imbalance and inflame fear of a nuclear confrontation. Historian Melvyn

Leffler explains, "Brezhnev had warned against another escalation of the arms race and even
offered to reduce the number of Soviet SS-20s if the West would talk and not act. But NATO

leaders moved ahead on 12 December [1979], saying they were wiling to talk but would not stop
their plans to deploy 464 ground-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles in Western Europe along
with 108 Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Brezhnev and his colleagues were
dismayed. The Americans were again seeking to negotiate from strength."

Under Reagan,

official US national security policy outlined in NSDD 75 meant that, in reaction to the SS-20
deployment, the only option for American policymakers was to respond in kind, and move
forward with the Pershing II production and deployment.
Even before he took office, this was a point which Gorbachev understood all too well. In
his memoirs, Gorbachev wrote:

The decision to deploy SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe had reflected the style
of the Soviet leadership at the time, decision-making fraught with grave
consequences for the country. I had arrived at the sad conclusion that this step,
fateful both for our country and Europe and for the rest of the world, had been
taken without the necessary political and strategic analysis of its possible
consequences. Whatever the arguments advanced at the time to justify the
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deployment of such missiles, the Soviet leadership failed to take into account the
probable reaction of the Western countries. I would even go so far as to
characterize it as an unforgivable adventure, embarked on by the previous Soviet
leadership under pressure from the military-industrial complex. They might have
assumed that, while we deployed our missiles, Western counter-measures would
be impeded by the peace movement. If so, such a calculation was more than
122

naive.

In this single passage, Gorbachev demonstrates how history is never inevitable, but in hindsight,
can seem over-determined. Before the NATO Dual Track policy of 1979, before NSDD 75 in
1983, and before Reagan's statement to Congress in 1985, Gorbachev could see what he felt was

inevitable unfolding before his eyes. When Reagan took office, he not only upheld the US
agreement with NATO to respond directly to the SS-20 deployment, he encouraged a massive
military buildup in order to show the Soviet leaders that he was happy to play the tit-for-tat game.
To Reagan's great credit, by 1985, he was also willing to play tit-for-tat on arms reductions.
In this way, it really did take Gorbachev to break the cycle of counter deployments, war
scares, and paranoid living. Both Reagan and Gorbachev recognized the danger of perpetually
testing the rationality of their governments in response to crisis. Unfortunately, Gorbachev was
not the General Secretary until three consecutive Soviet leaders died while in office. As such,

the possibility of continuity in already strained relations was made even more difficult by the
reality of human frailty. Between the time Reagan took office in January 1981 to the time
Gorbachev took office in March 1985, Brezhnev, Andropov, and Constantine Chernenko all
passed away.

The rapid succession of Soviet leaders made it nearly impossible to build any kind of
rapport between Reagan and his Kremlin counterparts. The stability of relations between
Washington and Moscow was, from a certain point of view, dangerously reliant on the health of
two men at any given time. In both political philosophy and physical vitality, Gorbachev

represented a clear change within the Kremlin. At fifty-four Gorbachev was easily the youngest
member of the Politburo, and when he became General Secretary, Gorbachev was thirteen years

122 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 443-444.
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younger than the average age of thevoting membership.123 The INF Treaty more than just a
document: it is the written embodiment of Gorbachev's policies and personality, based on a life

spent in and out of the Soviet Union.

The INF Treaty

Treaties are contracts between nations, enforceable by war. In the nuclear age, breaking
a treaty could mean disaster for every living thing on Earth. MAD is the foundation of the INF

Treaty, and the foundation of MAD is rationality. Throughout the Cold War both governments
tested the rationality of their policymakers by practicing brinksmanship. The Korean War,
Taiwan Straits Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis, and even Able Archer were all tests of rationality,

which thankfully both governments continued to pass, at least on a macro level.
Following this analogy, if MAD is the foundation of the INF Treaty, then verification is
the framework. As noted above, both threats and promises are strategic moves in a "game of

nations." But strategic moves, by definition, must also be decisions that a player, or in this case a
national government, would not normally make. Initiating MAD is not in the best interest of a
rational policymaker, and is therefore a credible threat.

The promise to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether is also something that a rational

policymaker would not normally do, in part, because the United States and Soviet Union were not
the only two nations with nuclear weapons. Although the INF Treaty is bilateral, the parameters
take into consideration the global balance necessary beyond their own national interests. Most

notably at the time, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel also possessed nuclear weapons. It would
not be in the best interest of either the United States or Soviet Union to completely dismantle

their nuclear arsenal in a world where the lack of such weapons would be a geopolitical
disadvantage.

123 Hoffman, The DeadHand, 187.
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The agreement by Reagan and Gorbachev that nuclear war could not be won only
reinforced what generations of leaders before them understood. This can be confirmed by
analyzing the INF preamble. The treaty reads:
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Conscious that nuclear war would have
devastating consequences for all mankind, Guided by the objective of
strengthening strategic stability, Convinced that the measures set forth in this
Treaty will help reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international
peace and security, and Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the

Treaty on theNon-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, have agreed as follows:1
While both Parties agreed that nuclear war would be terrible for all people, they are not
negotiating the elimination of all nuclear weapons. They are negotiating a "strategic stability"
which will "reduce the risk" of nuclear confrontation. By eliminating short and medium range
missiles from their arsenals, both Parties reduced the amount of contingencies available to

policymakers who would otherwise consider nuclear war a possibility.
The INF Treaty is also loaded with language that speaks to the paranoid atmosphere that
came to a crescendo during Reagan's first term. Article V, section three reads:
Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at the
same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less than 1000
kilometers.125

This provision is especially important because of the content found in the Memorandum of
Understanding, which accompanies the INF treaty. The Memorandum contains a list of
deployment areas and missile operating bases, complete with latitude and longitude locations.

The location information makes targeting such facilities a matter of data entry. This information
could be utilized to plan a first strike against the other party. If policymakers believed a first
strike based on the location information, in combination with the capability of non-theatre

weapons to take out ICBM locations, were likely to result in the inability of the enemy to

124 "Treaty Between the United States of America andthe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles," December 8, 1987,
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retaliate, then it would be rational to attack. By outlawing the possibility of a confluence of
weapons in one theatre, the possibility of achieving a first strike advantage is lost, thereby
maintaining balance.
Further proof of distrust is evident in Article XII, which deals with interference and
obfuscation. Article XII, Section two reads:

Neither Party shall:
(a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party
operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or
(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in

accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.126
Both Washington and Moscow were clearly concerned that their track records regarding
espionage might reveal themselves in manipulating the verification process. If it could be proven
that either side chose to act contrary to the provisions of this section, the treaty would be broken,
and another escalation of nuclear tension would be likely to occur. Neither party wanted such an

outcome, but the only way to enforce such a rule is embodied in the spirit of the treaty to begin
with. That is, the point of the treaty is to reduce nuclear tension and the possibility of war, but
only if sufficient non-European theatre ICBMs are held in escrow.
The escrow of ICBMs is guaranteed by one simple concept: the elimination of all
nuclear weapons in the world does not preclude the ability to re-arm. Because of the risk
involved in complete bilateral disarmament, and the cost in time and money to re-arm, it is not
rational to eliminate all nuclear weapons from a national arsenal unless and until all nuclear

weapons are banned and destroyed under unanimous international verification treaties. It is only
rational to hold as many weapons as is absolutely necessary to deter a first strike attempt against a
government's own retaliatory capabilities. This was the goal of both Reagan and Gorbachev.
The verification promises in the INF Treaty, backed up by nuclear capabilities in escrow, ensured

126 "pNp Treaty", Article XII, Section 2.
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that the only rational choice for both Reagan and Gorbachev would be to sign the treaty and reap
the moral and political benefits.

To further guarantee that the treaty could not be superseded, Article XIV reads: "The
Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or

undertakings which would conflict with its provisions."127 The INF was given most-favoredtreaty status.

Regarding the internal debate between Haig and Weinberger, they both got what they
wanted. Haig's argument that the Soviet government would not negotiate until they faced a
credible threat proved to be true. But Weinberger got what he wanted with the promise of
verification. The NATO Dual Track policy was vindicated. By deploying the Pershing II
missiles to Western Europe, and simultaneously extending the offer of bilateral arms reduction,
Reagan gave the Soviets incentive to remove the SS-20s. Agreement on verification did
eliminate INF weapons from the European theatre, thereby returning the Cold War to the detente

era status quo of proxy wars and intervention!sm. This allowed Reagan to maintain the policies
of NSDD 75 without fear of nuclear confrontation. The strategic modernization process, in
combination with the INF Treaty, meant that the US had achieved unquestioned military
hegemony in the world, confirming Reagan's vision of a position of strength.
On December 8, 1987, in the East room of the White House, the INF Treaty was signed.

In time, the treaty led to the elimination of 1,846 Soviet SS-20s, and 846 American Pershing lis.
At the signing, Reagan said, "We have listened to the wisdom of an old Russian maxim, doveryai,
no proveryai - trust, but verify."
"You repeat that at every meeting," Gorbachev replied.

"I like it," Reagan said, smiling.128

127 "INFTreaty", Article XIV.
128 Hoffman, The Dead Hand, 295.
62

CHAPTER 3
THE CONTRA WAR: CONFLUENCE OF DOCTRINE AND DOMINOES

"The United States is practically sovereign upon this continent, and its fiat is law upon subjects to
which it confines its interposition." - Secretary of State Richard Olney, 1895
On December 23, 1972, Nicaraguans felt the ground move beneath their feet. Within one
hour, three consecutive earthquakes of 6.2, 5.0 and 5.2 magnitudes rocked the city of Managua,

five kilometers below the nation's capital. International aid poured in from around the world as
people sympathized with the difficult task of rebuilding a city destroyed by natural forces.

Unfortunately for the people of Managua, and the nation as a whole, much of the relief effort was
channeled into the private fortune of Nicaragua's long-ruling and US-backed dynastic family, the
Somozas. The political aftershocks of that misappropriation resulted in a series of violent
protests and brutal repressions that ultimately led to the ouster of President Anastasio Somoza-

Debayle in 1979, and the rise to power of the communist-inspired Sandinista National Liberation
Front (FSLN).

On the same day that Managuans experienced the Earth tremble, Hanoi was shaking, too.
From December 18 to 30, 1972, US President Richard Nixon was overseeing the bombing of

North Vietnam, known as the Christmas Bombings. By this time, public opinion in the US was

clearly against military intervention in Vietnam, which led Nixon to approve illegal covert
operations in order to hide his administration's escalation of the war, even as troop levels were
steadily decreasing. When the scope of Nixon's illegal activity was exposed in the Watergate

affair, American voters responded by electing the crusading moralist, Jimmy Carter, as president.
However, Carter's human rights based approach to foreign policy was quickly rejected as

evidenced by Ronald Reagan's victory in 1980. Reagan's rise to the presidency signaled a shift
away from American non-intervention in the Third World, and solidified the foundation for a new
era of overt proxy wars.
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Reagan's victory also brought about a change in overall American foreign policy
regarding the Soviet Union. Whereas Carter vacillated between his hard and soft line advisors in

an attempt to maintain the facade of detente, Reagan had no such qualms about challenging what
he saw as Soviet aggression in the Third World. This policy, known as the Reagan Doctrine, was
carried out in Nicaragua by supporting a wide variety of anti-Sandinista forces, known
collectively as the Contras. In an address to the nation from the White House on January 16,
1984, Reagan said, "History teaches us that wars begin when governments believe the price of

aggression is cheap."129 If he is to be taken at hisword, then the Contra War suggests that
Reagan and his administration believed that the human and material costs of supporting a war
against communism in Nicaragua was cheaper than any alternative, diplomatic or otherwise. For
the Reagan administration, pursuing the Contra War was cheaper than conceding the failure of

previous US policies in Latin America, cheaper than dealing with Congressional limits on
executive power in the post-Vietnam political landscape, and cheaper than allowing another inch
of soil in the Western Hemisphere to be threatened by communist ideology.
Reagan made an assumed cost-benefit analysis of implementing his Nicaragua policy in

relation to the loss of political capital domestically. Negative public opinion regarding the
administration's Nicaraguan policy could be balanced out by positive public opinion on other

issues, particularly the economic recovery after 1983. And even though Congress was dominated
by Democrats, there was a vocal and supportive minority of Republicans who worked to
implement administration policy. Therefore, the administration was able to continue its
Nicaragua policy until revelations about illegal aspects came to light during the Iran-Contra
Affair. Only then did was the administration forced to recognize that further pursuit and defense

of the Contra War might cost Reagan the presidency by way of impeachment. This indicates that

129 Ronald Reagan, Public Papers ofthe President ofthe United States: Ronald Reagan (Washington DC:
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the administration operated under the assumption that the only way to lose the Contra War was to
lose the White House.

The transition from Somoza to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua was directly tied to the
transition from Carter to Reagan in the United States. By the mid 1970s in Nicaragua, the
Somoza dynasty controlled fully one third of arable land, major construction projects, the meat
and fish industries, national airlines, radio stations, state television (the only channel), and a chain

of banks, all of which is estimated to have been worth nearly $1 billion.130 In reaction to the
blatant co-opting by the Somoza dynasty of developmental and humanitarian aid following the
1972 earthquake, many Nicaraguans began participating in a popular uprising against the
Somozas and their military, the National Guard.
The opposition to Somoza was highly diverse, but can be broadly conceived as two main
groups, which were divided by class. Nicaragua's business and middle class was generally
moderate, and led by an intellectual newspaper editor, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. The lower class,
which was a much larger plurality of the people, was represented by the FSLN, a nationalist
guerilla movement inspired by the Cuban model. The tenuous class alliance was shattered in
January 1978 when Chamorro was assassinated in Managua, causing the city to rumble once
again.

The Nicaraguan business elite organized strikes, which led to riots, and finally outright

military action on the part of the FSLN against the National Guard. Somoza was under attack in
his own country, and looked to Washington for help. But thanks to Carter's human rights-based
foreign policy, the moderates also looked to Washington for support. This put the Carter
administration in a difficult position. Carter and his advisors were worried that by moving

against Somoza, they would hasten the rise to power of the Sandinistas, thereby facilitating
communist ideology, and set a damaging precedent concerning Washington's other strong-man
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allies. And yet it was also clear that by continuing to support Somoza, Carter would be

contradicting his own foreign policy. While the Carter administration weighed its options, the
Sandinistas consolidated their power and the moderates lost not only Chamorro, but the political

initiative as well. Ultimately, Carter settled on bribery, and tried to manipulate the flow of US aid
money into Managua as a way of gaining concessions from the new Sandinista government on

behalf ofremaining Nicaraguan capitalist upper and middle classes.131 This policy had its critics,
but it was not a total failure. One historian explained:

Yet in the year and a half after the Sandinista victory, Carter managed to chart
out a policy that was both realistic and successful, as far as it went. In November
1980, when he lost the presidency to Ronald Reagan, U.S.-Nicaraguan relations
were constructive and the radicalization of the revolution that Carter sought to

avert had not happened. Nicaragua had not become another Cuba.

Reagan clearly saw things differently, and upon entering office he set about putting his own
foreign policy stamp on the region.

In the transitional period from Somoza-Debayle to a new government, US Ambassador to

Nicaragua Lawrence Pezzullo had negotiated an agreement in which Francisco Urcuyo Maliano
would become president of Nicaragua under a moderate government. State Department official
Paul Bremer wrote to Reagan's National Security Advisor, William P. Clark, regarding the
transition from Somoza-Debayle to a new government. Bremer wrote that Maliano had, "reneged

on the agreed upon scenario," and that, "his action more than any other resulted in the collapse of
the National Guard and the demise of the moderates and the total seizure of power by the

Sandinistas."133 The White House felt as though the US government had beenbetrayed by
Maliano and the Sandinistas. The Contra War was an attempt to punish the betrayal, and in the
process, bring stability back to the region in the form of a moderate Nicaraguan government,
favorable to the US.
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Scholars frequently use the Monroe Doctrine as a way of explaining long-term
foundations of US foreign policy in Latin America, and the Contra War is no different. Historian
Odd Arne Westad wrote, "As postulated in the Monroe Doctrine and reformulated many time
since, most US leaders believed it was part of their country's mission to lead the peoples of Latin
America and the Caribbean to democracy and capitalism, while keeping out foreign influences
that could 'seduce' the southern part of the hemisphere away from the path of

'Americanization.'"134 American leaders recognized thepotential wealth that could be extracted
from Latin American, if only the newly forming nations would conform to American principals
of capitalism.
Over time, the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine has been altered to fit numerous
geopolitical agendas, but there are two main themes, which the author of the doctrine, Secretary
of State John Quincy Adams, meant to set as precedents. These precedents are crucial to
understanding the Reagan administration's broad view of Latin American policy. The first
precedent is the concept of non-intervention by European powers in the Western Hemisphere.
This includes the "no transfer" policy, which was meant to maintain the existing balance of power

in the Americas by removing the ceding of territory for purposes of making alliances or finalizing
treaties. The second precedent is the spirit of anti-colonialism, which is a part of the American

mission-concept of foreign policy, bringing enlightened government to the less fortunate. In
effect, the Monroe Doctrine was a protectionist and missionary based view of foreign policy, in
which the US government is understood to be the only appropriate entity to undertake
intervention in the Americas.

For Reagan, these two precedents were seen as justification for preventing Soviet

clientism in the region, and guaranteeing popular democracy for the people who have been saved
from non-US foreign intervention. The Reagan administration feared that because Nicaragua was

Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third WorldInterventions and the Making ofOur Times
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the largest and most populous nation in Central America, if the Sandinistas retained power, the
surrounding nations would also fall to communist influence, supplied by Moscow, with Cuban
mercenaries. In Central America, Reagan saw dominoes.

The Monroe Doctrine is merely a distant cause of the Contra War, a base upon which
future American policy was built. Historian William LeoGrande explains:

To justify the subordination of Latin America to the United States, the doctrine of
Manifest Destiny was resurrected in a new form: it was the natural right of the
United States to expand its influence throughout the hemisphere just as it had
been its natural right to span the continent. The Roosevelt Corollary to the
Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1904, declared Washington's right to exercise
"an international police power" to maintain order and stability when Latin
American governments exhibited "chronic wrong-doing."
Neither Monroe nor Roosevelt, however, had any concern with communism, they were guarding

against imperialism. In the view of Ronald Reagan, communism was the new imperialism. As
such, his ideological interpretation of these precedents was colored by the Cold War, the doctrine
of containment, and American policy failures in Cuba and Vietnam.

With the Monroe Doctrine and the policies inherent in Dollar Diplomacy firmly
established as the distant and intermediate causes of the Contra War, scholars have tried to

explain the most immediate causes within the framework of the Cold War, most specifically,
Vietnam. The bitter aftertaste that most Americans felt after the Vietnam War affected their

views against future intervention. Historian and former US Ambassador to Nicaragua Mauricio
Solaun writes, "Vietnam was another watershed. The 'clientelistic' war proved too costly. A

national mood of pessimism developed against U.S anti-revolutionary interventions abroad. The
predicted 'domino effect' had not worked to spread Marxist-Leninist regimes beyond

Indochina."136 Reagan did not share this view. He was of the group that felt dissent at home had
prevented a declaration of war, and the full scale effort needed to win in Vietnam. As governor
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of California, Reagan shut down the state university system in an attempt to limit anti-war

protests, and called Berkeley a "hotbed of communism and homosexuality."137
One of the great challenges for the Reagan administration was to break out of the postVietnam anti-intervention approach to foreign policy under Carter, and reinstate the policy of
containment through confrontation. LeoGrande writes:
A victory in Central America would be Reagan's first foreign policy success and
its ramifications would be global. By defeating the Soviet challenge in Central
America, the United States would demonstrate to the Kremlin and its Cuban

proxies that the new president would not tolerate Soviet adventurism in the Third
World. And most important, it would demonstrate to the American people that
the United States could project military power into the Third World without

becoming entangled in another Vietnam.138
This policy is necessarily contradictory. In proselytizing for democracy, Reagan was a proponent
of popular will. Yet by consciously acting against public opinion in the US by pursing
intervention, he attempted to prove the consensus wrong, rather than validate the responsibility of
elected officials to carry out the will of the people. LeoGrande continues, "The debate over

Central America was, in large measure, an extension of the debate over Vietnam. For the Reagan

wing of the Republican Party, Central America was, first and foremost, an arena of struggle

between Communism and Democracy."139 In an effort to gain popular support of intervention,
Reagan tried to sell the Contra War as he saw the rest of the world: black and white, good and
evil.

Nicaraguans were quite aware of the history of American foreign policy in Latin

America. Although direct intervention in Nicaraguan affairs had been limited during and after
World War II, the US government was still seen as an overbearing power with its own interests at
heart. American actions negated the altruistic platitudes of statesmen espousing the moral

ambiguities of the Monroe Doctrine. By the mid-1970s, most Nicaraguans held the US
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responsible for the decades-long rule and corruption of the Somoza family. The first Somoza in
power, Anastasio Somoza Garcia, only gained his position after twenty years of intermittent US
Marine occupation from 1912 to 1933. Garcia was educated at West Point, and the National

Guard was founded and trained by American officers.140 During the same time period, the
namesake of the Sandinistas, Augusto Cesar Sandino, led a nationalist revolt against US control
from 192 to 1933. When the US Marines left, Garcia used the false pretense of peace talks to lure

Sandino into Managua, and then had him killed. In 1954 the US helped to overthrow the

democratically elected Marxist Jacabo Arbenz in Guatemala. In 1961 the US sponsored a failed
invasion of Cuba in the Bay of Pigs disaster. And in 1965, US troops were sent to the Dominican

Republic to protect American interests and stabilize the government.141 Therefore, any attempt
by Washington to achieve what policy makers believed was stability, was seen by Nicaraguans as
an attempt to subjugate and control them in an insulting and paternalistic fashion. This led to,
among other things, the new revolutionary government slogan, "Yankees, enemy of humanity."

By the time Reagan took office, the mood in Nicaragua was anti-American, and the
American people were anti-intervention. Neither of these points mattered to Reagan, since his

overriding ideology was shaped entirely by the Cold War, not public opinion. However, it is
terribly difficult for any president to carry out policy without domestic support, and so the
administration conducted an extensive public diplomacy campaign to sell the merits of supporting
the Contras. Accordingly, the administration's attempt falls into same pattern that was used to
justify intervention in 1823, 1904, and throughout the Cold War.

Why We Fight

Reagan's foreign policy was dominated by his view of the Soviet Union. He saw the
Soviets as the number one threat to American hegemony and the greatest challenge to global
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liberalism, capitalism, and democracy. Reagan felt that the best way to negotiate with the Soviet

Union was from a position of strength, but in order to maintain that position, or at least the image
of strength, the policy must be applied universally. The application of this logic can be seen in a
series of National Security Decision Directives (NSDD). NSDD 17, signed in January 1982,
called for the US to support "those nations which embrace the principles of democracy and
freedom for their people in a stable and peaceful environment," and to "support democratic forces

in Nicaragua."143 This NSDD fails to mention, however, that theUS had the opportunity to carry
out such policies under the Somozas, but chose not to enforce them. In 1982, with the revolution

over and the Sandinistas in power, Reagan was ready to use American influence to destabilize the
existing government in favor of a yet-to-be-determined third option apart from the return of
Somoza-Debayle or the continuation of the Sandinista government.

NSDD 17 also includes a directive to, "create a public information task force to inform

the public and Congress of the critical situation in the area."144 This directive is a clear example
of the administration's attempt to frame the public discussion regarding Nicaragua by controlling
the flow of information. There was no need to create a new task force to inform Congress about

any of Reagan's policies. The House and Senate each have their own dedicated committees

regarding Foreign Relations, Intelligence, and the Armed Forces. If members of his
administration needed to plead their case to Congress in an effort to elicit legislative support for

his foreign policy ventures, all they needed to do was work within existing channels of
communication.

The public also has an information gathering committee of sorts, the media. This was the
real target of NSDD 17. If the administration was able to dominate the media's narrative through

the "public information task force," then it was confident that public support for the war effort
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would increase. Greater public support for the president would put pressure on Congress to stay
out of foreign policy, which is exactly what Reagan wanted.
In May 1982, the White House issued NSDD 37. The first point of this directive was to
confirm the policy outlined in NSDD 17, but with some caveats. NSDD 37 declares, "Our

current public affairs and Congressional information programs will be improved. The public
affairs effort shall be internationalized, targeting opinion leaders and organizations

worldwide."145 This is not necessarily a change in policy so much as it is anexpansion. By
casting a wider net, the administration hoped to gain broader support. Additionally, if the

administration were able to secure international support, the US would no longer be acting
unilaterally, which would mollify some of Reagan's critics.
Additionally, NSDD 37 reads, "The Secretaries of State and Defense will review current
personnel strengths in the region for adequacy to carry out our policy and forward appropriate

recommendations forapproval."146 Reagan was putting in his own people in order to implement
his own policy. This astute political move served two purposes. Number one, Reagan was able
to cut Carter out of the Nicaragua discussion. Although aid to Nicaragua was suspended under
Carter, he had not done so until January 1981, just before Reagan took office. In order to
establish his own hard line credibility, and in an effort to distance himself from Carter
administration policies, Reagan authorized the resumption of aid to Nicaragua, only to have it
cancelled shortly thereafter. Carter had cut aid to get tough with the Sandinistas, but during the

election campaign, Reagan painted Carter as weak and ineffectual in dealing with communism.
By cutting off aid in his own right, Reagan could lay claim to being the one who stood up to
communism. Number two, Reagan could assert that some good-faith effort was made by his
administration to negotiate with the Sandinistas, but that the new government's obstinacy caused

the diplomatic rupture between the two nations.

145 National Security Decision Directive 37, Federation of American Scientists
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html (accessed April 20, 2011).
146 NSDD 37.
72

The full expression of Reagan's anti-communism and position of strength policies is
contained in NSDD 75, titled "US Relations with the USSR," released in January 1983. The

policy calls for the US to challenge the Soviet Union militarily, subvert the authority of the
Kremlin within the USSR, and at the same time always extend an olive branch to negotiate

should the first two points aggravate Soviet leaders to the point of exhaustion on any particular
issue. Because Reagan viewed the Soviet Union as the cause of unrest around the world,

particularly in the Third World, NSDD 75 is also representative of the approach that the
administration took towards the Sandinistas.

The most successful portion of this policy was also potentially the most dangerous:
military strategy. In part, NSDD 75 reads:

The US must modernize its military forces - both nuclear and conventional - so
that the Soviet leaders perceive that the US is determined never to accept a
second place or a deteriorating military posture. Soviet calculations of possible
war outcomes under any contingency must always result in outcomes so
unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no incentive for Soviet leaders to

initiate an attack.147

This line of thinking is contingent upon two very precarious assumptions. Number one, being
able to guess how Soviet leaders "perceive" a situation, and number two, what their

"calculations" might be if US policymakers correctly determined the answer to the first
assumption. When the two assumptions are combined, the situation reads like this: If Washington
guesses wrong on Soviet perceptions of any given situation, and then Moscow reacts in a way

that US officials did not anticipate, then US officials reserve the right to respond in a tit-for-tat
fashion based on the Soviet reaction, even though it was Washington's failed model that allowed
for the unanticipated reaction.

In the case of Nicaragua, the Reagan administration felt that an international communist
conspiracy, directed from Moscow, was controlling the Sandinista government in a clientistic

way. In response, the administration supported anti-communist groups in the Central America
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region in an effort to return to the predictable American allegiance during the Somozayears. But
this approach fails to recognize that Nicaraguans hated the Somozas and blamed Washington for
keeping the dynasty in power against the will of the people. Additionally, the idea that "stability"
is good was antithetical to nationalist movements during the concurrent decolonization and Cold

War years. American policymakers feared that nationalist movements would be co-opted by
communist movements. As a result, under the Reagan Doctrine, Washington supported anticommunist dictatorships, despite the absence of democratic reform.
Regarding the Third World, NSDD 75 also reads, "The U.S. effort in the Third World

must involve an important role for security assistance and foreign military sales, as well as
readiness to use U.S military forces where necessary to protect vital interests and support

endangered Allies and friends."148 Although Vietnam is never mentioned in NSDD 75, the
aforementioned portion is a direct challenge to the mood of anti-interventionism in both the
Congress and the American public in the wake of the Vietnam War and Watergate. Because this
statement appears in an NSDD, Reagan is arguing that in the interest of national security, the US

must increase arms sales to allies, and be ready to attack enemies unilaterally. This is exactly
how the US got involved in Vietnam in the first place. Anti-communism as a rule had been
exposed as flawed policy in Vietnam, but because Reagan was a true believer in escalating
American Southeast Asia policy, he saw no problem in applying the logic to Central America.
Just as in Vietnam, and Cuba before that, as the US increased pressure, local nationalists

and communists grew more and more determined to resist. In discussing Sandinista leader Daniel
Ortega, Westad writes, "But to Ortega - as to Castro twenty years earlier - this was much of what
his revolution was about: through support for revolutions elsewhere, his country showed not only
its internationalist solidarity with others, but - even more importantly - its independence and its
sovereignty vis-a-vis the United States." Regarding the decolonization period, the most effective

way to prove the credibility of any given government was to keep the US at arms length. From
I4S
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the FSLN point of view, the American-Somoza alliance was colonial in nature, and the
Sandinistas were fighting for control of their own national affairs.

A Public Offering

As required by NSDDs 17 and 37, the administration carried out a public diplomacy
campaign in an effort to increase support for its Nicaragua policies. In an April 1984 White
House talking points memo, the administration explained the legality of the Contra War by citing
precedent. Under the heading, "Legality of Defensive Paramilitary Operations," the argument
was made that US law, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and the Organization of
American States charter, all allow for the right of self-defense. The memo further reads:
Numerous precedents in inter-American relations have permitted paramilitary
self-defense against Cuban initiated guerrilla and terrorist warfare. The clear
evidence of Nicaraguan initiation of indirect aggression against its neighbors

makes theparamilitary activities of friendly states legal.149
This shows that the administration wanted to be seen as reacting to outside interference in
Nicaraguan affairs, and that the US was not the instigator of unrest in this case. By doing so, they
drew on the precedents set by previous administrations without ever discussing the merits of
those actions: the US has intervened in the past, so it must be allowed to do so at times of its

choosing in the present and future. Again, this fails to account for the Sandinista perspective that
it was the US who began the conflict by supporting the Somoza dynasty, in which case the
Sandinistas, among other Nicaraguans, were reacting to American, not Cuban, intervention.

The material support that Washington provided to anti-Sandinista forces was the glue that
held the differing groups together. The promise of small arms, communications equipment, and
cash from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) served as a very powerful incentive to the

various anti-Sandinista forces to cooperate with one another, and to conform to administration
goals. On of the most active groups was made up of former National Guardsmen, calling

149 Memorandum, Bob Sims internal White House memo, Nicaragua - Overview, April 1984, CO-114,
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themselves the 15th of September Legion. A small group ofNicaraguan moderates called
themselves the United Democratic Nicaraguans (UDN). As a condition of receiving aid from the
United States, these two groups, among others, were required to work together. The White House

had no intention of supplying a stalemate within a stalemate by fostering unrest between antiSandinista forces.150
The April 1984 memo also reinforced Reagan's attempt to distance his administration
from Carter's by noting the brief period of aid to Nicaragua from January to April 1981. While
the memo does include a statement of credit to Carter's policy, the wording of the text is
revealing: "President Reagan used a waiver to reestablish economic aid from January 22, 1981 to
April 2, 1981 in order to encourage Nicaragua to halt its indirect aggression. The Sandinista
government refused; and pursuant to congressional requirement, US economic aid was

terminated."151 Missing from this statement is the fact that Reagan used an "executive" waiver to
circumvent the congressional requirement to cut aid to the Sandinistas. Once Reagan's new
precedent was set, the White House claimed to be following congressional policy, in this case
foreign policy, and canceled the aid accordingly.
Another April memo, this one from 1985, indicates that one year later, the
administration's public diplomacy campaign was failing. In response, the State Department

(DOS) issued a memo titled, "If Congress Deserts The Contras." Though the administration
seems to have seriously supported the conclusions in this document, many of the points read as
hyperbole, having taken aim at the insecurities and stereotypes of the American public. This
memo is a window into what the administration thought about the intelligence and motivations of
the American people, and is representative of market research politics, in which people are sold

an issue based on public polling. By tying broader political topics to the Contra War, the
administration attempted to form a consensus against the Sandinistas from groups that might not

50 LeoGrande, Backyard, 115.
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have otherwise shared a common view on anything. In opening, the memo reads, "Another
American ally, armed by the United States and sent into battle, will have been abandoned. Defeat
and rout of the Nicaraguan Resistance would likely follow; freedom movements worldwide

would be demoralized."152 This indicates that the administration thought theproxy warmodel of
intervention could be vindicated, if only it never stopped. The statement also inherently linked
US assistance to freedom movements around the world, as though those movements might not
exist, let alone thrive, in the absence of American encouragement. That hubris, when combined
with the precedents of the Monroe Doctrine, and a hawkish view concerning American policy

failures in Vietnam, allowed for Reagan's interpretation of Central America as vital to national
security, and morally necessary.
The DOS warning continues, "The Monroe Doctrine would be a dead letter - replaced by

the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Soviets would have extended their totalitarian system to the

mainland of theAmericas."153 This statement seems to be directed at isolationists. By presenting
the Contra War as an attack on American historical precedent, however antiquated that precedent
might be when applied during the Cold War, the administration framed the war as an attack on
American ideology itself.
The authors of the memo caution, "With 'wars of national liberation' spreading, refugees
by the millions would begin the long march up the Pan American Highway into the United

States."154 Although immigration was, and continues to be, a serious issue to many Americans,
the idea that millions of people would be capable of walking from Nicaragua across Central
America and the full length of Mexico just to hit the Texas border, without any interference along
the way, is pure paranoia. While it is not implicitly stated as such, this point might have been a
call to Americans who were ^/-immigration. By the logic of this memo, in supporting the

152 Memorandum, If Congress Deserts The Contras, April 5, 1985, CO-114, WHORM: Nicaragua, Ronald
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Contras, would-be immigrants could be confined in their own country. With nativist concerns
covered, the DOS memo authors continue:

Managua will become Beirut West - a Mecca for international terrorists. The
PLO has already established an embassy the Iranians and Libyans have arrived.
Elements of the international terror network - the Red Brigades from Italy, the
Montoneros of Argentina, the Baader-Meinhof Gang from West Germany - have

been sighted in theNicaraguan capital.155
Here, too, while the authors might truly have believed in the importance of this issue, it can also
be seen as a thinly veiled attempt to drum up support from the Jewish community. By invoking
images associated with Beirut, Mecca, the PLO, and Euro-Fascism, the administration seemed
intent on framing the Contra war as representative of all conflict in the world. The
administration's argument seems to have been that, if only Congress and the American people

would more forcefully support the Contras, not only would American interests in the region be
well served, but the international communist movement, radical Islam, fascism, and Palestinian
nationalism could all be blunted and contained.

The April 1985 DOS memo also includes false binary framing of things that might
happen if Congress "deserts" the Contras. The memo reads, "Congress will have left the

President this alternative: Accept a metastasizing Communist cancer in Central America - which
could produce half a dozen Cubas in Central America within a decade - or send in the

Marines."156 This point fails to recognize the dynamism of future events, and makes it seem as
though the President would have to make a fight-or-flight decision. In this case, the "flight"

imagery is associated with "metastasizing cancer," and the "fight" alternative is represented by
the Marines. Since public opinion on both cancer and military intervention was quite low, the
administration hoped to convince people that and ounce of prevention (supporting the Contras)
would be worth a pound of cure (avoidance of direct US military action and cutting out
communism from Central America).

155 If Congress Deserts TheContras.
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One final point worth noting from the April 1985 memo is in direct response to the Bay
of Pigs invasion in 1961. The DOS memo reads, "The United States must not dishonorably
abandon men whom we armed, trained and encouraged to go into battle to recapture their

homeland from Communist tyranny."157 This situation is known as a "disposal problem." During
the 1950s, the CIA conceived an invasion of Cuba in order to overthrow Fidel Castro, but

Eisenhower hesitated to authorize the action because there was no plan as to who would run the
subsequent Cuban government, and no guarantee that such a government would be friendly to the

US. By the time Kennedy was in office, the CIA had finally formed a plan for post-revolutionary
Cuba, and the Cuban exiles that had been trained by the CIA were still around. Kennedy had a

difficult choice to make. Eisenhower asked the CIA to meet minimum requirements for invasion,
which it failed to complete until the new administration was already in office. As such, in order
to avoid invading Cuba, Kennedy would have had to tell the CIA that their years of planning was

for naught, and inform the Cuban exiles that they had no home to which they could return.
Kennedy ordered the invasion, and disaster followed. In Nicaragua, Reagan wanted to avoid such
a problem. Losing Cuba to the communist orbit was a great embarrassment to policymakers in
Washington, and Reagan saw removing the Sandinistas from power in Nicaragua as his chance to
exorcise the ghosts of Kennedy's disposal problem, making Cuba look like the exception rather
than the rule when challenging US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

Domino Theory Version 2.0: Central America
In order to maintain the argument that supporting the Contras meant fighting
communism, the Reagan administration relied on two important realities: 1.) following the antiSomoza revolution, the Sandinistas broke a 1979 diplomatic agreement, which would have

allowed for popular democracy in Nicaragua, by seizing control of the government, and 2.) the
new Sandinista government followed Marxist-Leninist ideology, which in and of itself was
If Congress Deserts The Contras.
79

unacceptable to Reagan. Under the Sandinistas, the new Nicaraguan government suppressed
domestic opposition and initiated an enormous military buildup. Fearing an arms race in Central
America, the administration argued that the Sandinistas were upsetting the balance of power in
the region, which was undermining otherwise-stable American allies in El Salvador, Honduras,
and Costa Rica.

In response to a request by the National Security Council, the Department of Defense
(DOD) issued a memo titled, "Should Nicaragua Be Called a Communist State?" The answer

was: yes. The memo cites numerous pro-Marxist public statements by Sandinista leaders,
including Minister of Defense Humberto Ortega and Minister of the Interior Tomas Borge. In an
August 1981 speech, Ortega is quoted as saying:
The scientific doctrine which guides our revolution is Marxism-Leninism, the
analytical instrument of our revolutionary vanguard to understand the historical
process and to create the revolution; Sandinismo is the concrete expression of the
historical development of the struggle in Nicaragua. Without Sandinismo we
cannot be Marxist-Leninist and Sandinismo without Marxism-Leninism cannot

be revolutionary.158
According to Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Reagan's Ambassador to the UN, authoritarian governments
could be turned into democracies, but revolutionary governments were repressive and susceptible
to totalitarian takeover, most notably in the form of communism. Therefore, it was necessary to

roll back the gains of the Sandinistas, as quickly as possible, to the moment in 1979 when
Maliano broke the diplomatic agreement with Pezzullo and handed the Nicaraguan government to
the Sandinistas.

If Ortega's statement is further analyzed, it becomes clear that the Reagan administration
and DOD interpretation of the Sandinistas was too narrow. The pattern of identifying Sandino
with revolution and nationalism was Nicaraguan tradition, dating back to the Depression-Era

guerrilla war led by Sandino against the client government propped up by US Marines. Sandino
had warned, "Do the Latin American governments think perhaps the Yankees would be content

15 Memorandum, Office of the Secretary of Defense to Robert M. Kimmitt, Should Nicaragua Be
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with the conquest of Nicaragua alone?"159 In discussing theconnection between Sandino and
Revolution, Westad writes, "Sandino's ideas were a form of millenarian socialism," and that

Sandino, "believed strongly in a united Central America, rid of foreign influence, and where the

peasants and workers would rule through their organizations."160 Byassociating Sandino with
Marxism-Leninism, Ortega expressed a political strategy to garner widespread support among
Nicaraguans who found organic nationalism to be a more palatable cause for revolution than
communism. In this way, the Reagan administration and DOD were not incorrect, but rather

incomplete, in their assessment of the Sandinista government.
The DOD memo authors do make a small concession on this point, but they also question
the logic behind the Sandinistas' less-than-total application of communist ideology. The memo
reads:

On the other side of the argument is the fact that the private sector still controls
most of the means of production in Nicaragua. This could indicate that the
Sandinistas are not, despite their rhetoric, dedicated Marxist-Leninists. It is more
likely, however, that they have delayed putting production under state control in
the belief that it is more practical to have a visible private sector to encourage
economic aid from Western countries.161
This memo validates LeoGrande's discussion of this issue, in which he notes, "Even if the

Sandinistas seemed responsive to U.S. demands, the Reaganites regarded such moves as merely
temporary and tactical - designed to buy time while the Leninists consolidated themselves.

Nothing the Sandinistas didcould penetrate this seamless web of ideological certainty."162 The
Sandinistas were in a lose-lose situation as long as Washington supplied the Contras. They had
the choice of fighting a prolonged guerrilla war in their own country against a well supplied and

diverse group of adversaries, or give up the gains they had won on the battlefield during the
revolution against the hated Somoza dynasty. Just ten months before the DOD memo, Secretary
of State George P. Shultz testified to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that,

159 Westad, Global Cold War, 145.
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"If we persevere in all aspects of our policy, solutions can be found short of defeat or

escalation."163 From the White House point of view, supplying a proxy war to destabilize the
Sandinista government would result in a stalemate in which US aid would outlast FSLN resolve,

resulting in a victory for US policy. This was siege warfare politics practiced through mercenary
interventionism.

Reagan administration views on Sandinista repression and the arms race can be found in
a correspondence between Oregon State Senator Jeannette Hamby and National Security Advisor

Robert C. McFarlane from 1984. In a letter directed to Reagan, Hamby writes that, "as a fellow
Republican" she must object to administration policies in Nicaragua. Hamby had visited
Nicaragua as part of an Oregon delegation, and in doing so, the observations she made caused her
to question the logic of Reagan's Nicaragua policy. She writes, "I returned home convinced that
our current foreign policy toward Nicaragua is forcing this nation to request the necessary aid

from Cuba and the Soviet Union." Hamby encouraged Reagan to "listen to the Contadora Group.

They offer ournation a way out of theimpasse."164 A discussion of the Contadora Group
follows, but McFarlane's response is worth investigating first.
Senator Hamby's letter was just one written articulation regarding some of the common

arguments against American intervention in Nicaragua, and so the response from McFarlane is,
perhaps, appropriately broad by design. McFarlane begins by restating the previously discussed
quote by Humberto Ortega from August 1981. Also included in the response are discussions of

Sandinista "internal repression" and the Central American arms race. McFarlane charged that,
"Independent political parties have been harassed, denied permission to hold public rallies; their
headquarters have been attacked and their leaders beaten." McFarlane continues, "The respected
newspaper, La Prensa, for years the voice of opposition to the Somoza government, has been
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closed down repeatedly and is heavily censored." In discussing the native Miskito Indian

population of Nicaragua, McFarlane writes, "From the time they came to power, the Sandinistas
have engaged in a systematic destruction of the way of life of the Miskito Indians [...] [they]

have been moved from their ancestral homes to detention camps."165 Thecase of theMiskito
Indians is unique among the varying groups which opposed the Sandinistas. Remember that the
Somozas accumulated control over one-third of arable land, but the area where the Miskitos live,

in the northern highlands and gulf coast of Nicaragua, is some of the most inhospitable terrain in
the country. As such, the Somozas had no need to pressure the Miskitos off their land. However,

the land redistribution program of the Sandinista government threatened the Miskito population,
and so they also joined the anti-Sandinista effort. Claims of Sandinista "repression" were not

contested any more than the classification of the new government as being communist. The issue
being debated by the Congress and the White House was the extent to which the United States
government should get involved in stopping Sandinista human rights violations, and curbing the
arms race.

Halting the arms race in Central America was vital to the Reagan administration's efforts
in the region, and an essential feature of the argument for supporting the Contras. If Nicaragua
were to be secured as a base for communist agitation on the mainland, the administration feared

that armed minority groups would undermine the governments of El Salvador, Honduras, and
Costa Rica, in an acrid vindication of the Domino Theory. In response to Senator Hamby,
McFarlane warned that the Sandinistas had increased their active duty forces to 40,000 troops,

(double the number of National Guard members under Somoza-Debayle), and maintained 50,000
reservists. In terms of weaponry, McFarlane accused the Sandinistas of receiving "sophisticated

weapons" from the Soviet Union, including, "T-55 tanks, amphibious ferries, helicopters and

transport aircraft." McFarlane argued that, "This buildup far exceeds Nicaragua's defense needs,

165 Letter, Robert C. McFarlane to Jeannette Hamby, June 19, 1984, CO-114, WHORM: Nicaragua, Ronald
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and the buildup is offensive in nature."166 McFarlane's value judgment that the Sandinista
military buildup was "offensive in nature" follows the logic of the Domino Theory and belief in
an international communist solidarity movement.

Despite the warning signs which confirm McFarlane's point of view, the size and speed
of the race to arms by the Sandinistas could have had real defensive purposes, too. Note that
McFarlane highlights the fact that active duty forces were greater than the National Guard ever
was. Consider, however, the Sandinista point of view that the United States backed the National
Guard for decades in an effort to suppress domestic opposition to the Somozas. The Sandinistas

feared American escalation of the Contra War in order to reverse the gains made by the FSLN
during the revolution. As a result, their military buildup can also be seen as defense against a
possible large scale US attack. Castro used the same strategy in Cuba after overthrowing Batista,
expecting the CIA to repeat the Guatemala operation against Arbenz. Castro was ready, and
survived. The Sandinistas were simply trying to do the same.

The Contadora Group
Beginning in January 1983, the foreign ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and

Panama formed a group to discuss a joint peace process for Central America. These nations
shared an interest in halting the expansion of a regional war, and preventing intensified US

military intervention in Latin America as a whole. By forming a group, each nation also hoped to
dissipate any negative response from the US in reaction to negotiating with the Sandinistas
unilaterally. For its part, the White House was happy to use the Contadora process as an excuse
for cutting off bilateral talks with the Sandinistas by arguing that continuing to do so would

undermine the multilateral approach by the Contadora group.167
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In October 1983, the Sandinistas proposed four draft treaties which covered overlapping
concerns in the region. LeoGrande writes:

In the proposed treaty with Washington, Nicaragua agreed to halt all aid to
regional insurgents and prohibit the use of its territory for foreign military bases
that would endanger the security of the United States. In return Washington
would stop aiding the contras, lift economic sanctions against Nicaragua, and
cease all military exercises in Nicaragua's vicinity. Within twenty-four hours,

Washington summarily rejected the drafts.168
Instead of accepting the draft treaty as an attempt at diplomacy, the Reagan administration saw
the offer as a sign of weakness, and felt that staying the course would soon lead to a change in the

Nicaraguan government.169 The change was not forthcoming, and nearly a year later, the
Sandinistas agreed to sign a treaty offered by the Contadora group in September 1984. In doing
so, the Sandinistas put the onus on the Reagan administration to prove it really was dedicated to
peace by agreeing to sign the treaty as well. The administration rejected the offer, claiming that
the security provisions were unbalanced and that there was no verification agreement on

enforcement of the treaty. When elections were held in Nicaragua in November 1984, the
Reagan administration pressured international election officials to boycott participation, claimed
the campaign process had been unfair and marked with violence, and ultimately undermined the

credibility of the whole process.170
In an effort to influence the multilateral peace process, in March 1985, Reagan wrote

identical letters to the four Contadora presidents. The letter is representative of the one-sided
nature of US efforts in general to end the Contra War. By attempting to steer the Contadora
process from the outside, Reagan hoped to influence the outcome of negotiations while claiming
that Latin American leaders were taking the initiative on their own. Because the United States
had enormous economic leverage over the Contadora participants, Reagan used his position to

dictate terms during the negotiation process. After having rejected offers from the Sandinistas in
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1983 and the Contadora group in 1984, the administration was ready to offer its own plan.

Reagan wrote, "I believe that peace will never be achieved in Central America until the armed
struggle in Nicaragua is ended through national reconciliation based on truly democratic

elections."171 Reagan canhardly be blamed fordiplomatic relations between theUS government
and the Somoza dynasty. Unfortunately, previous American support for the Somoza dynasty,

which also prevented "truly democratic elections," was seen as precedent by many people in
Nicaragua, not just the Sandinistas. Therefore, Reagan's call for democracy was understood by
many Nicaraguans as an attempt to turn back the clock to a time before the revolution.
Reagan then discusses the most recent negotiation offer, he writes, "The principal leaders
of Nicaragua's democratic opposition groups signed a declaration on March 1, 1985, in which
they offered a ceasefire in return for agreement by the Nicaraguan government to a dialogue

mediated bythe Bishops Conference ofthe Roman Catholic Church."172 This statement includes
two problems inherent in dealing with the Sandinistas. First, the idea that Catholic bishops would
be fair arbitrators in any peace process was rejected by the Sandinistas because the bishops in
Nicaragua had been in collusion with the Somoza dynasty. Second, by agreeing to this offer, the

Sandinistas would be setting a precedent of their own by implicitly endorsing the right of loyal
opposition within Nicaraguan politics. Combining these two requirements would have left the
Sandinistas with less power, at the hands of what they perceived to be corrupt bishops, in a

political atmosphere that would allow outside sources to fund opposition within Nicaragua.
Also included in the Contadora letter is a reaffirmation of NSDD 75 and Reagan's

concept of a position of strength. Reagan continues, "My government intends to take action
designed to strengthen Nicaragua's democratic resistance forces while encouraging the Sandinista

regime to agree to Church-mediated dialogue."173 According to NSDD 75, it was administration
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policy to challenge communist governments in the Third World. Yet by offering to negotiate

while facilitating hostility, the administration proved its consistency of policy application. This
was the approach vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in general, as well as the approach used by NATO in
Europe regarding nuclear forces. The White House saw no need to alter course, since doing so
would destabilize the foundation of Reagan's foreign policy.

Reagan's final point in the Contadora letter is a threat. He writes, "If the Nicaraguan
government accepts the offer of dialogue with the opposition, then my government's assistance
will remain limited to humanitarian purposes for a sufficient period to allow a serious dialogue to

achieve progress."174 The alternative, of course, is the continuation of the Contra War. This
approach is sheer obstinacy, which offers no concessions to the Sandinistas for all their efforts.
The FSLN had fought militarily against the Somozas during the revolution to gain a greater voice
in government. After the revolution, right or wrong, the FSLN continued to consolidate power,

and continued to fight militarily for its survival. The Sandinistas felt they had made real
sacrifices in their rise to power, and had no desire to simply hand over the government to
Catholics and capitalists. The Sandinistas rejected Reagan's proposal. Both the US and
Nicaraguan governments accused the other of negotiating in bad faith. The Reagan

administration response was to continue the Contadora process, which it could control. The
Sandinista response was to try to move negotiations to the UN, where they would have the
support of the Soviet Union. Neither plan worked effectively.

The War at Home

As the Reagan administration tried to sell the Contra War, Congress tried to bring down

the price. One example of the administration's attempt to sell the war is embodied in an April
1985 memo between two Reagan advisors, Peggy Noonan and Pat Buchanan. Noonan wrote the
memo to Buchanan regarding her suggestions for an "Influential Citizens event," which Noonan
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described as "the bipartisan bignames event," planned for later that month. Noonan paints a vivid
picture of Reagan leading the unnamed group of bipartisan supporters "like a nice big citizen's
army" out to the White House Rose Garden, and with the "most famous faces" in the background,

Reagan should make a "short pungent speech about how these fine Democrats and Independents
are standing for freedom." Noonan goes on to suggest, "maybe we could have a Koch, a
Kissinger, a Brzezinski all around him nodding in the background." Noonan is not suggesting

that those men will actually be in attendance, but rather the points of view and the political bases
which they represent should be seen as supporting Reagan in this effort. She then lays out a plan

for manipulating the media in terms of both written and visual content, and closes by writing that

the Influential Citizen's reward should be to "buy them a scotch."175 This style of information
choreography was necessary for the Reagan administration because of the strong effort by
Congressional Democrats to limit the power of the executive in the aftermath of the Vietnam

War. By framing the Contra War as a bipartisan effort, Noonan, Reagan, and the rest of the
administration hoped to gain support for their point of view by making it seem as though there
was a bipartisan consensus. For their part, the Congressional Democrats resisted supporting the
Contra War through some questionable foreign policy interference, as well as established

legislative measures to limit intervention by flexing their power of the purse.
In March 1984, ten Democratic members of the House of Representatives signed a letter
addressed to Sandinista leader Commandant Daniel Ortega. In the letter, the Congressmen
lament the administration's policy toward Nicaragua, and pledge, "We have been, and remain,
opposed to U.S. support for military action directed against the people or government of
Nicaragua." The Congressmen recognize that, "The Nicaraguan people have not had the
opportunity to participate in a genuinely free election for over fifty years." They also repeat the
administration's refrain about the importance of protecting political pluralism and freedom of
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assembly. On the surface, this letter is a soft line approach to ending the Contra War, but in
reality, the Congressmen are making the same case as the administration. The Congressmen
argue that if the Sandinistas guarantee the security of loyal opposition within Nicaragua, the US

will cease in supplying the Contras with warmaterials.176 Boththe White House and Congress
agreed that in truly democratic Nicaraguan elections, the Sandinistas would be voted out of
power, if not immediately, then in short order. By supporting an environment in which the

Communist Party has to operate by the same rules as any other political party, most policymakers
in Washington believed that the right amount of aid money would eventually tip the voting
balance away from the Sandinistas toward more moderate and US-friendly political parties.

Despite the similar goals of both the House Democrats and the Reagan administration,
many Republicans saw the "Dear Commandant" letter as an affront to the executive branch's
privilege of exclusive control over foreign policy. Representative Newt Gingrich wrote to
Reagan's Chief of Staff James Baker, complaining that, "While this letter so far has received little
press attention, it may prove to be a decisive turning point in the post-Vietnam Congressional
involvement in the daily execution of foreign policy." Gingrich argued that the message of the

Ortega correspondence, "clearly violates the Executive Branch's exclusive prerogative" of
negotiating with foreign governments. Gingrich also cited precedent as far back as the Articles of
Confederation to support his criticism of the Ortega correspondence, arguing that the
Congressmen had stepped "across the boundary from opposition to a policy, to undercutting that

policy."177 McFarlane responded to Gingrich onbehalf of the administration. In his letter,
McFarlane wrote, "I share your view that the American people should be aware that this type of
private diplomacy undercuts the President's efforts." McFarlane also noted, however, "The

President stated that Congress is a significant partner in foreign policymaking, but we must work
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as partners."178 The Congress controlled monies being used to support the Contra War, and inthe
years leading up to this particular exchange of letters, the House had been actively pursuing limits
on executive power in Nicaragua. McFarlane and the rest of the administration understood that

attacking Congressional Democrats in the way Gingrich did would be a far more effective method
of undermining Reagan's foreign policy than working with the Congress, particularly since
legislatures had already taken visible steps to limit funding the Contra War.

In December 1982, Congress unanimously passed the first Boland Amendment, named
for Missouri Democrat Edward P. Boland. This amendment eventually became the first in a

series of Congressional checks on executive power, all of which became public laws, but that was
not necessarily the original intent. Journalist Gary Webb explains:
Boland, a member of the House Intelligence Committee, knew full well that the
CIA was funding the Contras, and he was not opposed to it. The Intelligence
Committee, a body generally protective of the CIA, had been one of the few
committees told of the secret Contra project. To quiet other liberals, Boland
agreed to an amendment that prohibited the use of taxpayer funds "for the
purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua or provoking a military
exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras." The House passed it on Christmas

Eve 1982 bya vote of 411-0.179
Webb's argument is that the CIA, White House, Defense Department, and the Contras'

Congressional supporters all understood the Boland Amendment to be a play on words and an

empty promise. Webb writes, "If the Contras were given money for one purpose and decided to

use it another way, well, that wasn't the CIA's fault, was it?"180 By designating that no funds
could be used for the purpose of "overthrowing the government," funds could simply be
designated for some other purpose, allowing the Contra War to continue.

In October 1983, a more stringent law was passed by the House, known as the second
Boland Amendment. This amendment prohibited covert assistance for military operations in

178 Letter, Robert C. McFarlane to Newt Gingrich, May3, 1984, CO-114, WHORM: Nicaragua, Ronald
Reagan Library.

179 Gary Webb, Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion (New York: Seven
Stories Press, 1998), 152.

180 Webb,Dark Alliance, 153.
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Nicaragua and instead authorized overt assistance to neighboring countries.181 Bypassing this
legislation, House Democrats were trying to force the administration to limit its war within the
public diplomacy campaign limits, which Reagan was framing. The second Boland Amendment
was meant to concentrate appropriated funds into an effort to curb the arms trafficking between

the Sandinistas and communist movements in Nicaragua's neighbors. Since protecting allies and
checking communist expansion in the region was the administration's main argument for
supporting the Contra War, House Democrats were of the opinion that limiting funds to that
purpose would end Executive attempts at widening the conflict.

For a third consecutive year, in October 1984, Congress passed a resolution limiting the
scope of funds to be used for the Contra War. House Joint Resolution 648 prohibits the use of
funds for use in the Contra War except under certain conditions, and only if an additional joint

resolution approved such funds on a case by case basis.182 By adopting this strategy, theHouse
Democrats hoped to nickel-and-dime the President into either revealing the scope of the Contra
War one action at a time, or to cease covert activity all together.
Finally, in the summer of 1985, the Senate joined the House in limiting Executive war

making powers regarding Nicaragua. The Senate severely limited the legality of funding the
Contra War by prohibiting funds authorized by the Senate, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,

and the Arms Export Control Act, for providing assistance to any person or group involved in
rebellion or insurgency in Nicaragua. The bill further prohibits use of funds sent to allies for the
same purposes.

Members of Congress were not alone in their disapproval of the Contra War. Public
opinion in the US was consistently against intervention in Nicaragua, despite administration

181 BillSummary and Status 98th Congress House Resolution 2968, Library of Congress online
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d098:HR02968:@@@L&summ2=m& (accessed April 27, 2011).

12BillSummary andStatus 98th Congress House Joint Resolution 648, Library of Congress online
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d098:HJ00648:@@@L&summ2=m& (accessed April 27, 2011).
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efforts to rally support. Political Scientist Gordon L. Bowen discusses this in an investigation of
public opinion regarding US Nicaraguan policy. Bowen writes:
Despite the most popular president in recent decades focusing substantial effort
on winning the public over to support the Contras, and despite several episodic
"rallies" of heightened support, never did a majority of Americans back the
Contras project. Each Reagan-era "rally" certainly had an immediate impact on
measureable attitudes toward U.S. Nicaragua policy. However, these changes
were transient: in the end these rallies did little that was durable to alter the

general distribution of Americans' opinions, which fundamentally were to

oppose further aidto the Contras.184
Both the American people, and the Congress which represents them, were against Reagan's
Nicaragua policy. Yet even in the face of such popular discontent and legal limitations, the
administration continued to pursue the Contra War. That pursuit solidified the link between

Vietnam and Nicaragua, and nearly cost Reagan his job as president.

The Iran-Contra Affair

In December 1983, activities in the Middle East became important in relation to the

Contras, although it was not apparent at the time. Over the course of fifteen months, eight
Americans were taken hostage in Beirut. Mounting pressure on the Reagan administration to
secure the release of the American captives, combined with the administration's policy to never
negotiate with terrorists, led to a set of illegal activities including an arms-for-hostages deal with

Iran. Upon delivery of arms shipments, it was assumed that the Iranian government would then
use its political influence over the hostage takers to secure the release of the Americans. The

profits from the arms sales to Iran were to be secretly diverted to support the Contras. The
Administration could thereby appear to be in compliance with the Boland Amendments, and
continue its Nicaragua policy, as long as the source of the funding remained a secret. That secret

also protected Reagan from being accused of negotiating directly with terrorists for the release of
American hostages.

184 Gordon L. Bowen, "Presidential Action and Public Opinion about U.S. Nicaraguan Policy: Limits to the
'Rally 'Round the Flag' Syndrome," Political Science and Politics, Vol. 22 No. 4 (December 1989): 799.
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Just as the hostage crisis emerged, the administration was forced to deal with the funding

problem caused by the Boland Amendments in relation to the Contra War. In March 1984, CIA
Director William Casey sent a memo to McFarlane regarding the "Supplemental Assistance to
Nicaragua Program." In part, the memo reads:

In view of possible difficulties in obtaining supplemental appropriations to carry
out the Nicaraguan covert action project through the remainder of this year, I am
in full agreement that you should explore funding alternatives with the Israelis

and perhaps others. ... You will recall that the Nicaraguan project runs out of
funds in mid-May. Although additional moneys are indeed required to continue
the project in the current fiscal year, equipment and materiel made available from
other sources might in part substitute for some funding.

This is a clear reference to the Boland Amendment regarding covert action funding, and an

obvious example of the administration's desire to continue such operations. The alternatives

presentedin the memo are trafficking captured arms through Israel, and outside assistance from
another country. The principles were now in place for what would become the Iran-Contra
Affair.

In June 1984, the National Security Planning Group held a meeting on Central America.

The meeting was, among other things, called to discuss third party funding of covert activities in

Nicaragua. In attendance were President Reagan, Vice President George H. W. Bush, Casey, and
others. In the meeting, Secretary of State George P. Shultz shared the feelings of Chief of Staff
James Baker, "that if we go out and try to get money from third countries, it is an impeachable

offense."186 At the same meeting, withReagan present, Bush raised the problem of third party
quidpro quos. Bush asked, "How can anyone object to the U.S. encouraging third parties to
provide help to the anti-Sandinistas? The only problem that might come up is if the United States
were to promise to give these parties something in return so that some people could interpret this

185 William Casey Memorandum for Robert McFarlane, "Supplemental Assistance to Nicaragua Program",
March 27, 1984. Reprinted in Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne, eds. The Iran-Contra Scandal: The
Declassified History (New York: The New Press, 1993), 66.

186 Minutes, National Security Planning Group Meeting on Central America, June25, 1984. Kornbluh and
Byrne, Iran-Contra Scandal, 77'.
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as some kind of an exchange."187 This meeting indicates that Reagan was well informed of what
his subordinates were doing. Therefore, by his direct inaction, Reagan was complicit in the
activities as well. These interconnected policies continued for two years.
In October 1986, a CIA cargo plane was shot down over southern Nicaragua, killing two
American pilots. A third American, Eugene Hasenfus, parachuted out of the plane and was
captured by the Sandinista army. Under interrogation, Hasenfus revealed a network of Contra

resupply operations and safe houses in El Salvador, and admitted that it was his understanding

that the operations were sanctioned bythe CIA.188 Hasenfus was on the cover of every major
newspaper in the US, and any credibility that the administration had in denying covert operations
in Nicaragua was gone, and the secrecy of administration activity began to deteriorate.
Shortly thereafter, Administration dealings in the Middle East also came to light. In
November 1986, a Lebanese newspaper, Ash-Shiraa, published an account of a heretofore secret
trip by McFarlane to Teheran earlier in 1986, in which McFarlane was helping to facilitate the
arms-for-hostages deals. The entire affair was being exposed, and in turn revealed a major

contradiction in Reagan's policy of not negotiating with terrorists, as well as confirming that the
administration had been involved in an illegal war in Central America.

On March 4, 1987, Reagan addressed the nation regarding the Affair. In one of his most

famous lines, Reagan said, "A few months ago I told the American people I did not trade arms for
hostages. My heart and my best intentions still tell me that's true, but the facts and the evidence

tellme it is not."189 That was as close as Reagan came to admitting he hadauthorized members
of his administration to fund an illegal war in Central America by selling arms to governments
which associated with terrorists. The Iran-Contra Affair exposed the illegality of the
administration's Nicaragua policy and effectively ended US involvement in the Contra War. For

87 Minutes, June 25, 1984. Kornbluh andByrne, Iran-Contra Scandal, 82.
88 Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal, 402-403.
189 Ronald Reagan, PPP 1987 Volume I, 209.
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Reagan, the cost of pursing his goals in Central America had finally caught up to the expected
benefits.

The suspension of US aid to the Contras did not, however, end the Contra War. The

inertia created by US overt and covert support through Honduras and El Salvador assured that, by
1987, the Contras were so well armed and supplied that they were able to challenge the FSLN
militarily. In 1988 the fighting ended, and by 1990 presidential elections were held in Nicaragua.
Daniel Ortega was defeated by Violeta Chamorro, widow of the slain opposition leader and
newspaper editor Pedro Chamorro.

While investigations into Iran-Contra continued into the George H.W. Bush
administration, they were thwarted by the outgoing President's Christmas Eve pardons in 1992.
Bush pardoned McFarlane, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Duane Clarridge (CIA),

Clair George (CIA), Elliot Abrams (State Department), and Alan Fiers (CIA), saying that "their

motivation.. .was patriotism."190 In response to the pardons, Lawrence Walsh, the independent
counsel investigating Iran-Contra, released his own statement: "President Bush's pardon of

Caspar Weinberger and other Iran-contra defendants [...] demonstrates that powerful people with
powerful allies can commit serious crimes in high office - deliberately abusing the public trust -

without consequence."191 In the end, Thomas Clines was the only Iran-Contra participant to serve
a prison sentence. He was convicted of falsifying tax records.
From the jungles of Central America, to the deserts of the Middle East, and the highest

reaches of Washington politics, the Contra War serves as a clear example of containment gone

wrong. While the memory of intervention in Vietnam kept Reagan from gaining public support
for the Contras in Nicaragua, it was the memory of Watergate that kept him in office after his
cover was blown in Iran. The administration nearly pulled the temple down on their heads, just

George Bush, Presidential Pardon of Caspar Weinberger, Elliott Abrams, Duane Clarridge, Alan Fiers,
Clair George, and Robert McFarlane, December 24, 1992. Kornbluh and Byrne, Iran-Contra Scandal, 374.

1Lawrence Walsh, Response to Presidential Pardons, December 24, 1992. Kornbluh andByrne, IranContra Scandal, 377.
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as Richard Nixon and his administration had done over Watergate. And yet, when compared to

Reagan's goal of thwarting communist expansion in Central America and his ability to remain in

power amid scandal and illegal activity, it turns out that, for Reagan, the Contra War really was
cheap, after all.
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CONCLUSION

The legacy of the Reagan administration lives on in a variety of ways which continue to
effect American foreign policy today. When Reagan left the White House, he left a world in
which the largest economic and political tectonic plates were sliding in obvious directions:

Capitalismwas rising, Communismfalling. Whether or not credit should be given to Reagan and
his administration alone is up for debate. One view is that it was Reagan's specific policies

which forced change within the Soviet Union, leading to dissolution of the world's last great
multi-ethnic empire. Another view is to point to obvious cracks within the communist structure,

and argue that Reaganjust happened to be in office during an unstoppable culmination of flawed
communistpolicies. Undoubtedly, the truth is made up of aspects from both viewpoints. The
written articulation of Reagan's overriding Cold War policy, NSDD 75, proves as much. The
administration identified what it saw as Soviet weaknesses, and made the conscious choice to

pressure Moscow in those areas. However, Reagan and his team would never have been in the
position they were in the early 1980s if it had not been for the decades of containment policy
carried out by the previous administrations from Truman to Carter.

Reagan's bipolar view of the world during the Cold War endures in the modern War on
Terror. While not strictly a phenomenon developed under Reagan, on some level, the

government continues to present international relations as "us vs. them." In a speech to the
British House of Commons, Reagan warned that "the march of freedom and democracy.. .will

leave Marxism-Leninism onthe ash-heap of history."192 In 1983, Reagan famously labeled the
Soviet Union an "evil empire" and warned people not to "remove yourself from the struggle

192 Address to Members ofthe British Parliament, June 8, 1982 in Public Papers ofthe President: Ronald
Reagan. Eds. Wilma P. Greene, Katherine A. Mellody and Kenneth R. Payne. (Washington DC: United
States Government Printing Office, 1983),747.
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between right and wrong and good an evil."193 Inthe wake of the Al-Qaeda attacks of September
11, 2001, George W. Bush said, "We are a country wakened to danger and called to defend

freedom." Bush continued, "Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you

are with us or you arewith the terrorists."194 This overriding necessity to define American
strength through confrontation is the most violent aspect of America's missionary style of

diplomacy. In that element, throughout his administration, Reagan pursued interventionaround
the globe on behalf of American interests and ideology. But in the absence of a dominating

Soviet challenge in the current political environment, the "us vs. them" model of diplomacyhas
often been misconstrued as a "United States vs. the World" point of view, in which ultimatums
like those of Bush serve to undermine US benevolence, and reinforce paranoid views of
American designs on perpetual global dominance.

Reagan's hatred of communismalso led him to proselytize the need for proxy wars in a

way which left a very distinct impact upon leaving office. During the 1980s, the US supported
the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union as a part of the Cold War. In 2001, the
United States began participating in a war against Al Qaeda and their Taliban allies within

Afghanistan as a part of the War on Terror. That war is still raging ten years later, or nearlythirty
years later, depending on how you look at the conflict. Rather than continuing to fight within
their own borders, Al Qaeda members based in Afghanistan chose to bring the war in Central

Asia to what they perceived to be the cause of the conflict: modernizationin the form of
globalizedcapitalism, represented by the World Trade Center and the US Government. Al Qaeda
has turned Reagan's interventionist foreign policy against the United States in an effort to curb

193 Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association ofEvangelicals in Orlando, Florida,
March 8, 1983 in the Public Papers ofthe President: RonaldReagan. Eds. Maxine L. Hill and Thomas D.
Kevan. (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1984), 364.

194 Transcript of President George W. Bush's address to a joint session of Congress September 20, 2001,
CNN online http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-20/us/gen.bush.transcript 1 joint-session-national-anthemcitizens? s=PM:US (accessed April 27, 2011).
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American expansionism in the former Third World in the same way the US had traditionally
worked to contain communism: by exploiting superpower weaknesses, not matching strengths.
The Obama administration is now faced with unique decisions of its own. The dynamism

of geopolitics in relation to the Arab Spring and the War on Terror has forced the current
administration to reexamine traditional American alliances in the Middle East and North Africa.

However, in opening up the Arab world to democracy, many suspected enemies of the United

States would be allowed participation in governments that had previously suppressed anti-

American elements bymanipulating elections and violating human rights.195 Transposing Reagan
Doctrine policies onto the Arab Spring situation would have meant supporting former Egyptian

president Hosni Mubarak and the monarchy in Bahrain, while attacking the Muammar Gaddafi
regime in Libya. The Obama administration seemingly stood idle as Mubarak was forced from
office, and allowed a proxy army of Saudis to maintain control over Bahrain by suppressing calls
for political reform, but intervened directly in Libya by supporting the rebels, carrying out air
strikes, and maintaining a no-fly zone over Libyan territory. In the Libyan case, the Reagan
Doctrine is once again in competition with the anti-interventionists who fear another Vietnam.
The Obama administration faces the challenge of walking a fine line between the two schools of
thought in formulating an effective policy to protect American interests in the region.

Regarding the specific case studies herein, over twenty years after Reagan left office, the
impact of his policies is clearly evident. In Saudi Arabia, the United States continues to enjoy a

stronger alliance than with any other Muslim majority state, and the AWACS deal ended up being
a precursor to increased American involvement in the Middle East during operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm in the early 1990s. Just as in the 1980s, the enormous size of the oil
market in the United States guarantees that one of the Saudis' best interests is to maintain positive
diplomatic relations with the Washington.

195 Caroline B. Glick, "OurWorld: Clueless in Washington," The Jerusalem Post, February 1,2011.
http://www.ipost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id::=206121 (accessed May 9, 2011).
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Additionally, just as the Saudis were reliable American allies during the Cold War, the
Saudis are also a close ally of the United States in the War on Terror. In the 1980s, Reagan

argued that the Soviets and Iranians were the biggest threat to security in the Persian Gulf

region.196 While the Soviet threat is long gone, theIranian government, dominated by Shia

clerics, continues to challenge Saudi dominance inthe region.197 As such, the Saudis continue to
send oil to the United States, and the US government continues to send weapons to Saudi Arabia.

In Europe, Reagan's policies have been vindicated most fully. The INF Treaty
eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. Once it became clear that neither Gorbachev nor

Reagan had designs on authorizing any form of a nuclear first strike, and that Gorbachev would
no longer enforce the Brezhnev Doctrine, the anti-communist movements within the Eastern Bloc
flourished. By the end of 1989 the Polish Solidarity movement had triumphed, the Berlin Wall
was torn down, and the Domino Theory of communism in Southeast Asia and Central America
was proved correct, but in the opposite direction, as one after another, the former Soviet satellites
broke away from Moscow and formed new democratic governments. A popular sign during the

late 1989 protest movements sums up the transition: "Poland: 10 years, Hungary: 10 Months,

Germany: 10 Weeks, Czechoslovakia: 10 Days."198 Both East and West Europe have come
together under the banner of economic cooperation, first in the Common Market, and now the
European Union. -

The Reagan administration impact on Central America, Nicaragua in particular, is mixed.
Broadly considered, Reagan's goal of securing the dominance of democracy in the region has
borne fruit. Each of the Central American nations is now a democratic republic, and Nicaragua

has had regular democratic elections since 1990. Yet some critics have argued that the 1990

196Nicholas Latham, Selling AWACS toSaudi Arabia: The Reagan Administration and the Balancing of
America's Competing Interests in the Middle East (Praeger: Westport, 2002), 2.

197 Michael Slackman, "TheProxy Battle in Bahrain", The New York Times, March 19, 2011,
http://www.nvtimes.com/201 l/03/20/weekinreview/20proxy.html (accessed May 9, 2011).

198 Elzbieta Matynia, "Poetics of the Revolution: Some Notes from Poland", Performing Arts Journal Vol.
12 No. 2/3(1990): 17.
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presidential election victory of Violeta Chamorro over the Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega was a
result of Nicaraguan fears of another US escalation of the Contra War if Ortega were to remain in
office. Later, the administration of Arnoldo Aleman was charged with corruption, and Aleman

was sentenced to twenty years in prison for embezzlement and money laundering.

As the years pass and more archival material is made available to historians, the image of
just exactly who Reagan was, what his policies meant, and where they came from, will continue

to come into focus. Just as perceptions of Dwight Eisenhower changed after the publication of
Fred Greenstein's TheHidden Hand Presidency, perhaps the world is simply waiting for the first

great Reagan book to facilitate some consensus. In the meantime, we are left to live among the
shadows of the Reagan era, darting in and out of the light as world events dictate.

199 Thomas W. Walker, Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the Eagle, (Westview Press: Boulder, 2003),
58-70.
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